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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
In a seminal work concerning CLs specifically addressed to policymakers and legal 
professionals from developing countries, Correa examined the grounds for the provision 
of CLs in various developed countries and highlighted how such countries had 
employed such a remedy as a regulatory tool in order to attain diverse public interest 
objectives.1 The study submitted that developing countries had little experience in the 
field and that an examination of the experience of developed countries with regard to 
such remedy may bring options to developing countries willing to legislate on this 
matter.  
 
The present work is about CLs and pursues the same objective. However, it deals in the 
main with a recent and particular application of CLs. It focus on how CLs have been 
provided by the EC as a solution to bring to an end the abusive use of copyright by 
copyright holders enjoying a dominant position. The aim of discussing such an 
application is twofold: first, to explore how CLs have been used in Europe to limit 
copyright and attempt to find the logic supporting the provision of such a remedy; next, 
to examine if it would be possible under the current Mexican regulatory framework to 
use such a remedy as an option to resolve similar conflicts that could arise in Mexico.  
 
CLs appear in two different ways in national frameworks. They might be incorporated 
into copyright laws, as an internal limitation to right-holders’ exercise of rights. 
Alternatively, they may occur as a consequence of the application of competition law by 
judicial or administrative authorities.  
 
While patent exclusivity has traditionally been the target of CLs, their application to 
copyright is very recent.2 Differences among the patent and copyright paradigms may 
 
1 Correa (1999) p. 2 
2 The first application was the Magill Decision. See section. 3.3.2.   
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explain copyright’s isolation from competition law.3 Unlike what happens in the field of 
patents, the argument that states that copyright by nature confers a monopoly right, is 
unclear.4 Moreover, while patents protect specific solutions copyright only protect 
expression of ideas. Therefore, a patent holder may prevent third parties from using a 
specific invention, while no copyright infringement may occur if two persons write 
similar poems, as long as both have followed a separate creative process. Finally, unlike 
patents, a copyright user may find it easier, to a certain degree, to find substitutes to 
cover the same need.5  
 
Nevertheless, it is perceived that competition authorities in developed countries are 
increasingly extending their surveillance over copyright owner’s behaviors. In my 
opinion, the social and legal developments which are briefly described hereunder might 
be the cause of such new perspective. Since I believe that developing countries will 
follow a similar path, one of the main objectives of this work is to contribute to create 
awareness in developing countries with regard to such trends and developments.  
 
A. Increasing application of competition rules toward copyright.  
 
To perceive IP law as separated from competition law is still a common place.6 A 
somewhat romantic and still widely held notion of copyright’s rationale, as a tool for 
protecting poets and writers rather than powerful software corporations, lies at the heart 
of such separation. However, such a misconception is apparently changing. 
Interestingly, Gervais notes that, after the marriage of IP rights and competition rules in 
the TRIPS agreement, the notion of IP rights, as a variation of the classic theme of 
property or even as human rights – theories developed in the XIX century – might be 
condemned to fall.7 Experience of developed countries has gradually pointed out that IP 
rights may allow their owners to take advantage of their position to control a market, by 
preventing or deterring potential competitors from developing products similar to their 
own, with the specific purpose of maintaining high prices for the product, to the 
 
3 For a detailed economic and legal comparison of such paradigms, see Rahnasto (2003) and Ghidini 
(2006).  
4 Sterling (2003) p. 993. 
5 Ghidini (2006) p. 61. 
6 Ghosh (2005) p.794 who observes that the U.S. experience was built on such misconception. 
7 Gervais (2005) p. 505  
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disadvantage of competitors and consumers alike.8 Even though copyright per se cannot 
be hold as a legal monopoly right, recent case law and literature reveal that its exercise 
may create factual monopolies or at least give rise to anticompetitive behaviors.9 It is 
observed that doctrinal and jurisprudential approaches are gradually shifting from 
immunizing IPR-based restraints on trade from antitrust challenges. IP rights are treated 
in the eyes of competition law as any other property.10
 
B. Competition law as a cure for copyright “overprotection”  
 
It is alleged that the past decades have seen an expansion in the reach of intellectual 
property, both over time and across countries.11 Examples frequently quoted in 
literature as evidence of such alleged “over-extension” are the legislative protection 
granted to digital right management systems12 and the extension of the term of 
protection of copyright from 50 to 70 years. Due to its potential to foreclose access to 
information, two examples of such apparent over extension over time are worth 
mentioning: the extension of copyright protection to software, achieved on the basis of a 
disputable analogy13 and the legislative trend to protect databases through sui generis 
rights.14   
 
 
8 Bainbridge (1999) p. 22-24. The term monopoly bears to distinct meanings: (i) describing a situation of 
fact, namely the situation where, in the market place, one person is the sole purveyor or a certain 
commodity Sterling (2003)  
9 The term monopoly bears to distinct meanings: (i) describing a situation of fact, namely the situation 
where, in the market place, one person is the sole purveyor or a certain commodity, thus having no 
competition and; (ii) describing a situation in law, namely the sole right to sell a certain commodity, such 
right being granted by law see further Sterling (2003) section 2.13.   
10 Ullrich (2005) p. 728 
11 “Over time” because copyright has extended protection to every new technology; “Across countries”, 
because TRIPS has created a worldwide system of heightened protection of IP. See Fink (2005) p. 770; 
Okediji (2005) p.144 
12 See, e.g., Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the information society (O.J. L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 10), Articles 6 and 7. 
13 Apparently, software gained copyright protection when the code was deemed to be a representation of 
an idea. Ghidini argues that software is a solution with a commercial application, more than an aesthetic 
expression of an idea and, therefore, is a product that might be closer to qualify for patent, rather than for 
copyright protection. Software assimilation to a copyright product has a dramatic consequence: software 
products are protected for 70 years instead of receiving perhaps a protection similar to patents (generally, 
20 years). See Ghidini (2006) p. 63.. 
14 A sui generis right granted to database-owners protects databases not due to their originality – perhaps 
the main criteria for a work to qualify under copyright protection – but merely because of the investment 
placed on the development of the databases. See further Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of 
databases (O.J. No. L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20), Article 7. 
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Similarly, the extension of copyright across countries has been recently subject to 
considerable criticism and high public awareness. It is argued that developed countries 
prompted the universalization of their own IP protection standards, without any 
consideration about its impact on developed countries; the objective was to secure and 
expand markets for their own companies worldwide.15 It is frequently remarked that 
knowledge industries conducted intense lobbying, both at national and international 
forums, and that such lobbying afforded right-holders with the best laws money can 
buy.16 It might therefore not be surprising that some industrialized countries receive 
91% of cross-border royalties and technology license fees.17   
 
While developing countries have intensified their claims for reforming WIPO copyright 
instruments in order to incorporate measures that promote access to knowledge and 
technology18 literature is exploring if competition law would be a more appropriate 
“cure” for the problem. It is submitted that competition law works against excessive 
protection of IP rights and, thereby, may promote the social interest in gaining access to 
otherwise protected subject matter.19  This might not only happen case by case, but also 
by incorporating competition rules as part of a broader policy that promotes access 
where such access is necessary for national strategies concerning education and 
innovation.20  
 
C. Rediscover of copyright protection. Copyright as a strategy 
 
Until very recently, copyright was seen as being a part of cultural policy as the 
legislation was relevant only to the experts of collecting societies and media houses.21 
This has all changed. Information is indisputably a key factor in the new economy. 
Rahnasto observes that companies are increasingly using IP rights as part of their 
business strategy because firms are conscious that through IP rights it is possible to 
 
15 Correa (2003) p. 178. 
16 Samuelson (2005) p. 7. 
17 A study with regard to royalties derived from patents reveals these numbers. See Correa (2003) p. 177.  
18 See Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the establishment of a development agenda for WIPO. 
WO/GA/31/11, August 27 2004. 
19 Drexl (2005) p.716-724. 
20 Fink (2005) 771. 
21 Rahnasto (2003) p.7. 
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control other firms’ behaviors.22 Such strategies include the use of “leverage” practices, 
which actively aim to control the external effects23 of patents and copyright in order to 
maximize business.24
 
Moreover it is important to mention that this development is powered by the two trends 
referred above. Professor Ghidini observes: 
 
[…] Copyright protection is much more reliable than patent protection, since the 
former is less difficult (selective) and less expensive to access (“no test, no cost”), 
longer in duration, richer in monopolistic content… and, last but not least, much 
more generous in extending exclusive protection to subject-matter… It is not 
surprising if the many industrial and financial interests involved in developing the 
innovations typical of modern advanced technology, especially innovation, 
consisting in representations expressing informative content intended for purely 
functional purposes seek succor within the realm of copyright: a realm much less 
beset with anti-monopolistic concerns than the patent-based regulatory framework of 
technological innovation… 25
 
D.  Changes in models for innovation and network effects.   
 
Copyright exclusivity has traditionally been justified as the most adequate tool for 
promoting innovation. However, it is gradually noted that as industrial economies 
change to information-based network economies, so are the models of innovation 
changing. Rahnasto compares the “serial model of innovation” (where a company 
makes an invention and other companies develop such invention further) with the 
emergence of a “simultaneous model of innovation” where there is not one, but multiple 
sources of information (either private or in the public domain). For innovating through 
the second model, access to basic information is vital.26 The consequences might be 
 
22 Id.  
23 An “external effect” or “externality” is an economic term. Rahnasto provide in her study a widely used 
definition of the concept. However, in order to clarify the term, I choose to include here the example she 
offers: “If the Linux operating system is less attractive for users because copyright owners manufacturing 
DVD movies with technical protection means allowing them to be played only on Windows operating 
system, the exercise of copyright has an external effect on the market of software operating system”. Id. p. 
1. 
24 Rahnasto (2003) p. 7. For an example of this kind of leverage practice, see the Microsoft Decision 
referred to in section 3.4.2 below.  
25 Ghidini (2006) p. 64. 
26 Rahnasto (2006) p.5. The author cites the development of Linux as an example of this model.  
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huge for an innovation policy. In the first model, the IP owner appears as the innovator 
and the licensee as a follower, as an adapter and, at the best, as an adopter.27 
Conversely, in the second model, the licensee may contribute with its own know-how 
and improve the first innovation. As observed by a commentator: With digital goods, 
every user is potentially a creative re-user and not a mere consumer.28   
 
A second issue concerning IP and the so-called new economy is the capability of IP-
protected products to generate network effects. In simple terms, this means that a 
product may become extremely valuable to consumers because so many other people 
use the same or compatible products.29 Products that interact with other products would 
be preferred by the consumer in his/her initial choice. This might lead to the 
development of de facto industry standards in particular markets.30 As the network 
increases in the number of people so will the demand for a product increase; 
consequently, people willing to leave the network will have to evaluate the cost of 
switching. Moreover, such demand-side costs will play against potential competitors, 
which will consider such costs as a barrier to entry to the market, isolating the IP owner 
in a de facto monopoly.31  
 
In view of these developments, it is imperative for policymakers, judges and legal 
professionals of developing countries to rethink the relationship between copyright and 
competition. A country which allows IP companies to enjoy immunity from 
competition; which succumbs to IP industry pressures and adopts strong IP protections 
with minor or no public debate; which allows corporations to exercise their copyright 
abusively, exploiting benefits from network effects and traditional models of innovation 
and which ultimately lets them increase their market power by not preventing obvious 
leverage practices – such a country should not be surprised if the TRIPS promise of 
development is never accomplished.   
 
 
27 Ullrich (2005) p. 751.   
28 Dreier (2001) p. 312. 
29 Gitter (2005) p. 189. 
30 For an example of a copyright deemed to be a de facto standard see the IMS Health Decision, referred 
to in Section 3.3.2. For an example of one deemed as causing network effects, see the Microsoft Decision, 
referred to in Section 3.4.2. 
31 Narciso and Torremans (2005) p. 181. 
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It is necessary to develop a more rigorous relation between competition law and 
intellectual property. I agree with Correa that this objective may only be achieved by 
conducting an examination of developed countries experiences with regard to IP and 
competition law. Such experiences may lead developing countries to determine 
appropriate competitive baselines for designing more innovative intellectual property 
systems.  
 
1.2 Research Problem  
CLs are versatile tools, both in design and practical application. This thesis deals with 
CLs both as a limitation provided by IP law and as a remedy provided by competition 
law. 
 
The thesis is divided in two main parts. The first explores the legal grounds and the 
rationale that supports the three CLs ordered by the EC, in competition cases, where 
such application created an obligation to license a copyrighted work. The understanding 
of such structure and rationale may allow us to assess if such a remedy represents an 
option for developing countries.  
 
The second part discusses Mexico’s readiness to benefit from such legal European 
development. Options are submitted to appear in two directions. The first explores the 
possibilities and hurdles that Mexico might face if choosing to build a CL regime under 
the TRIPS agreement. The second path explores the possibilities of using such licenses 
without a substantial copyright reform, merely by applying Mexican competition law 
rules.  
 
1.3 Structure 
The second chapter provides an overview of the main compulsory licenses schemes, 
both within and outside the IP universe. The objective of such exploration is twofold: 
first, to help the reader to identify the remedy and distinguish it from other concepts that 
might be confusing; secondly, to offer the reader an overview of the rationale and 
efficacy of the remedy and the public objectives pursued by its provision.  
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The third chapter deals with the European experience in the field and the development 
of the doctrine that supports the use of CLs. Three cases are analyzed: Magill, IMS 
Health and Microsoft. In the analysis, a conscious choice has been made in trying to 
highlight in which specific circumstances copyrighted information was found as needed 
to be licensed in order to restore competition.  
 
The fourth chapter explores the second research problem. It explores the penetration of 
CLs in Mexican copyright law. Then, it explores the possibilities of designing a CL 
regime within that copyright law. Finally, it explores the possibilities of providing CLs 
based on the current regulatory competition law framework in Mexico.  
 
1.4 Methodological considerations and limitations 
This work is about how CLs may be used as remedy in copyright abuse cases. The use 
of CLs with regard to industrial designs, trademarks and other IP rights are not 
discussed in this book. As an exception, references concerning the provision of CLs 
with regard to patents have been made. Such reference is obligated since developing 
countries’ academics and judges are making use of the rich experience in this field when 
discussing the benefits of CLs as a remedy in copyright cases. A reference to such 
debate is also relevant in order to cast light over the nature and efficacy of such a tool in 
developed countries, which is one of the goals of this thesis. Consequently, such 
references do not pretend to be exhaustive, but only serve the abovementioned 
objectives.   
 
Despite the above-mentioned limitation, this work does not deal with CL regimes 
designed in the context of specific copyrights. The goal is to cast light on how this 
remedy has been used in cases where an undertaking, in a dominant position, exercises 
their copyright abusively and such abuse harms competition. Therefore, this work does 
not deal directly with cases or provisions involving CLs and distribution of rights, 
parallel importing of copyright works, performers or rental rights. Likewise, this work 
does not deal with CLs as an established remedy in the context of mergers that 
otherwise would violate the law. Such a remedy is not discussed since CLs are not 
issued to cure an abuse, but as an efficient alternative to divestiture.  
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My review focuses on the law and case law of the European Union because this is the 
leading jurisdiction when it comes to the use of CLs as a competition law remedy to 
copyright abuse. Limited references are made to the law and policy of the U.S. and 
other developed countries in order to highlight the relevance of CLs in such 
jurisdictions, as a check and balance mechanism, particularly, with regard to misuse of 
patents. In general, such debate provides important conclusions which are applicable 
also to CLs in copyright.  
 
I am aware that the method used for interpreting case law and administrative decisions 
potentially affects the results of the research. Such materials include arguments 
advanced by copyright owners, potential users and the authorities. CLs, therefore, might 
be presented by different studies as heroic tools that promote access and development or 
as enemies that jeopardize investment in innovation. When reporting the cases, a 
deliberate choice has been made to emphasize where institutions have made a bet for 
supporting fairness on the merits rather than following (or even twisting) a particular 
doctrine; to highlight where competition, access to information and socio-economic 
development, and governmental intervention have outweighed copyright, individual 
reward and “strong” property rights theories, respectively. My choice pursues 
consistency with the aim of this thesis. However, this work strives to present also the 
polemic generated by the use of the remedy in order to offer a complete picture.  
 
In any case, it is important to remark that this work does not intend to serve as a 
comprehensive study of the laws, case law or doctrines discussed, nor deal in detail with 
such materials, nor assess the legitimacy of their application within a particular national 
or international legal framework. Such work is more appropriate for, and has been 
carried out by, numerous outstanding scholars in developed countries. My work stands 
on their shoulders and is aimed just to provide information that might serve Mexican 
(and other developing countries’) policymakers and judges to get acquainted with these 
developments. Similarly, Mexican scholars should not seek in this work absolute 
conclusions but ideas that might server as a departure point for future debate and more 
in-depth analysis of the many issues raised here.   
 
My research problem is located in the interface between competition law and IP. 
However, this work does not describe the basic legal frameworks covering such 
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disciplines in any particular country. It is presumed that the reader has a general 
understanding of the basic concepts of such disciplines. It is presumed as well that the 
reader has a general idea of which countries might be considered as developed and 
which as developing. Readers interested in such topics will find several outstanding 
books listed in the bibliography to this thesis.  
 
I acknowledge that there are a number of considerable differences between the 
copyright and competition law systems of the European Union, the U.S. and Mexico; 
such differences do not arise only due to the historical background but also from the 
differences between the common law and the civil law tradition and the copyright and 
author’s right tradition. However, it is important to consider that IP laws have 
converged to a large extent in those jurisdictions with the universalization of IP 
standards through international and regional instruments, such as TRIPS, WCT and 
NAFTA. While such universalization has not occurred in the field of competition law, 
there is some evidence that soft harmonization of criteria among authorities of the three 
jurisdictions may provide sufficient ground for undertaking useful comparative studies. 
This is particularly true with regard to developing countries, like Mexico, where legal 
transplants in these fields are usually undertaken in order to mirror developed countries’ 
legislation and create “friendly” frameworks that may attract developed countries’ 
investment.   
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2 Compulsory licenses:  Structure, rationale and efficacy. 
2.1 CLs: General understanding. 
 
IP national laws, in general, allow IP owners to license their rights. By means of the 
license, a licensee is authorized to perform certain acts with regard to the copyright or 
patent involved, acts which otherwise would be considered as an infringement of IP 
laws. Conventional wisdom would follow that we may identify a CL whenever it 
appears that the owner is forced to grant such permission, involuntarily, to one or more 
potential licensees. Such coercion, in a democratic society, shall necessarily derive from 
the application of statutory law or occur as a consequence of a legal process.   
 
Yet, this chapter reveals that CLs are versatile remedies. What they all have in common 
is that they represent a limitation to the exercise of IP rights.  
 
2.1.1. CLs as limitations within the IP system.  
 
CLs are one among many tools that legislators may use to balance the conflicting 
interests of right owners’ exclusivity with users’ desire to access protected works.32 A 
succinct comparison with some other copyright limitations available may cast light over 
the concept. From a structural point of view, limitations inherent to copyright system 
may be roughly classified as follows:33  
 
 
1. Full exception. This kind of limitation simply withdraws from the owner the 
right to prohibit user’s actions over the copyrighted work. There is no need for 
the user to ask for an authorization and the use is not subject to any economic 
compensation. 
                                                 
32 Dreier (2001) p. 307.   
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2. Statutory licences. In this kind of limitation, authorization is provided by the 
statutory law, but against the payment of an equitable remuneration. Particularly 
important is to mention that there is no intervention of the copyright owner in 
negotiating the amount of the remuneration because in this kind of limitations, 
the royalty fee is fixed by law or by a regulatory authority.  
3. Compulsory licenses. When subject to a compulsory license, the right owner is 
forced to grant individual licences, at a price and under conditions to be 
determined jointly with the user or fixed by the authorities where agreement 
cannot be reached.  
4. Mandatory collective administration of rights. In this case, the right owner is 
forced to assign certain rights to a collective entity because such an entity is 
entitled by law to exercise exclusively the rights.  
 
While limitations described in numbers 1 and 4 above can be clearly distinguished from 
CLs, such is not the case with regard to statutory licences. In fact, Guibault notes that, 
in the field of copyright, both terms are used interchangeably.34 Likewise, Okediji 
apparently focusing more in the effect of its application, includes both terms in the 
broader category of limitations that provide “mandatory compensated access” in 
contrast with “negotiated access”.35   
 
In my opinion, CLs represent, first, an obligation to contract –a duty to licence – with 
one or more potential licensees.36  In a wide-used definition, Gorecki observes:  
 
"A compulsory license is an involuntary contract between a willing buyer and  
an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state." 37
 
The main practical consequence of this feature is that in principle, the order to license 
does not affect the ability of the IP owner to negotiate the terms of the contract, 
including the royalty fee.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
33 Guibault (2002) p. 23. 
34 Guibault (2002) p. 25. 
35 Okediji (2005) p. 148. 
36 Guibault (2002) p. 25.  
37 Gorecki (1981) p.18. 
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A second feature is the intervention of a government’s administrative or judicial 
authority. While statutory licenses derive from the application of statutory law, CLs 
may only be granted after a specific application of a court or administrative resolution.38 
However, authors differ in the level of involvement of the government.  While for 
Julian-Arnold’s definition the license is “arranged” by the government39 in Correa’s 
definition, the government grants directly the authorization to use the protected good, 
apparently without intervention from the right owner.40 Gorecki’s definition suggests 
that governments also enforce such license. This element could be important if we 
consider that some licences may be granted to past, present and future IP products and 
that therefore, enforcement mechanisms shall be put in place.41
 
2.1.2  CLs as a limitation provided by Competition Law 
 
While copyright preserves the exclusive right, competition law prima facie has a 
problem with whatever restricts competition and particularly with monopoly effects.42  
 
CLs ordered to restore competition do not bear a similar structure to those provided by 
IP regimes. This is mainly because the two systems operate in different ambits. IP 
regimes define rights and structure an array of diverse limitations. On the other hand, 
competition deals with specific behaviours and tries to bring them to an end through 
sanctions and/or remedies.   
 
Competition law may play a role in defining the boundaries of IP rights at a 
policymaking level.43  At such a stage, the tool may be framed in copyright instruments 
either in vague or in highly complex terms. For example, in TRIPS, CLs concerning 
copyright do not have a specific structure; conversely, the issuance of CLs for patents, 
are conditioned by TRIPS article 31, to a number of qualifications.44  
 
 
38 Sterling (2003) p. 993. 
39 Julian-Arnold (1993) p. 352. 
40 Correa (1999) p.3. 
41 See Microsoft Decision, Section 3.4.2. 
42 Narciso and Torremans (2003) p.145. 
43 Drexl (2005) p.718. 
44 See Section 4.4. 
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On the other hand, CLs may be granted on grounds of specific competition rules. 
Competition regimes usually structure prohibitions of anti-competitive behaviours 
through per se rules. For example a rule may consider “price fixing” per se as an 
anticompetitive behaviour. It might not matter if the firms involved in the practice 
operate in the oil or the copyright industry or if any of the undertakings have or have not 
substantial market power. Liability would arise from the mere evidence of the 
behaviour. Since CLs are granted to terminate such practices, the remedy is usually 
tailored to address the specific problem.45 Consequently, the structure of the license will 
vary from case to case. In most cases, competition authorities let the licensor choose the 
terms of the contract and reserve for themselves the faculty to approve the final draft.  If 
an agreement is not reached within a specific date, a Court may impose the license. 
Royalties, as well, may vary. While in the EU the right owner is usually entitled to 
reasonable royalties, in U.S. law and practice sometimes even no royalties have been 
concede in favour of the right owner.46
 
2.2 Overview of the use of Compulsory Licences: provision, application, rationale 
and efficacy. 
2.2.1. CLs within the IP system.  
Patents  
CLs arrived on the scene at the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property, after the Conference that reviewed such instrument in 1925. Article 5 (2) 
entitled countries of the Union to adopt in national laws provisions for the granting of 
CLs in case of “abuse” of patents. However, the instrument only dealt with one type of 
abuse: Non-working patents. CLs were implemented here with the intention of 
promoting local working of patented inventions and to prevent the patentee from 
denying the public access to novel and needed inventions, where to withhold such 
subject matter was unreasonable or contrary to the public interest.47  
 
 
45 See Chapter 3. 
46 See Infra Note 47. 
47 Julian-Arnold (1993) p. 352. 
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After the referred Conference, provisions on CLs were adopted in several countries. 
Correa notes that the process of diffusion of CLs took place in parallel to the broadening 
of the grounds under which such licenses might be granted, and that the original 
rationale of preventing the non-working of patents was gradually extended to other 
situations such as public interest, government use and anticompetitive practices.48  
 
Several studies that have analysed diverse jurisdictions have identified the most 
prevalent grounds for the provision of CLs49. CLs are provided in order to prevent the 
existence of non-working patents, including dependent patents,50 and on different 
grounds connected to public (government) non-commercial use.51  
 
Patent literature provides a broad debate among supporters and critics of the limitation.   
 
First and foremost, it ought to be mentioned that developed and developing countries 
have different viewpoints on this matter. Developed countries consider that the goal of 
the patent system is to encourage investment in innovation. CLs are seen as having the 
effect of making such investment less secure and attractive. Developing countries, on 
the other hand, fear that multinational companies will exploit local consumers by 
charging high prices for access to patented goods, particularly medicines and therefore 
have strongly advocated maintaining systems of CLs.52  It is imperative for the purpose 
of this work to remark that despite developed countries’ apparent hostility with regard 
to the tool, CLs have only been actually provided in such countries.53  
 
With regard to the efficacy of the tool, Kaufmann observes that CLs are a fact of law, 
but not a fact of life. The author bases his conclusion on surveys that explore the actual 
 
48 Correa (1999) p.4 . 
49 For a detailed classification and examples in several countries, see Julian-Arnold (1993); Fauver 
(1988). 
50 Cases where a second-in-time-issued (dependent) patent cannot be worked without infringing an earlier 
issued patent. 
51 Governments may use CLs for the prevention of anticompetitive practices; for supplying the market 
with essential goods (such as medicines), to face emergency situations and for the acquisition of 
inventions related to national defense See Note supra 47.  
52 Julian-Arnold (1993) p. 357. 
53 CLs have been used only in Japan, Germany and Canada: see. Kaufmann (1998) p. 530. It is interesting 
to observe that the U.S. has rejected the tool in its legal tradition and has opposed the incorporation of 
CLs in the framework of developing countries; notwithstanding this, it is perhaps the country where most 
CLs have been granted, in antitrust cases. See further Correa (1999). Likewise, the EU is the only 
jurisdiction in which CLs have been granted against copyright holders. See further Chapter 3.  
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application of CLs in patent cases and concludes that while CLs provisions exist in 
nearly every important country, such licenses are almost never present in real life.54 
While this argument is accurate according to my research, it is also important to 
mention that is generally accepted that such numbers do not reveal the efficacy of the 
remedy. The mere threat of CLs encourages parties to grant licenses voluntarily.55  
 
CLs for governmental non-commercial use have not attracted so much criticism as long 
as such licenses are granted against the payment of a reasonable royalty.56  
 
Berne Convention  
 
The Berne Convention includes three of the best-known examples of CLs in the field of 
copyright.57 Such provisions are included in Article 13, Article 11 bis (2) and in the 
Appendix of the Berne Convention.  
 
Article 13 allows a country to design in its jurisdiction a CL scheme where an author 
might be forced to license his exclusive right to authorize the sound recording of his 
musical work and/or lyrics. Ricketson explains that before the Berlin Revision of the 
Berne Convention in 1908, a flourishing recording industry was able to record works 
without fees or compensation to the authors. The recognition of an author’s mechanical 
right in the Convention was seen as a peril by the industry. CLs were provided here in 
order to secure, for the recording industry, a possibility to have access to protected 
material. 58 The only requirement provided in Article 13 is that CLs might not prevent 
the author from obtaining and equitable remuneration.  
 
Subject to a similar condition, CLs provided in Article 11 bis (2), might be issued in 
order to force an author to license his right for broadcasting his work. The rationale is 
similar. After the extension of the authors’ right to include the right to broadcast, in 
1928, broadcasting companies were concerned about the prospect that collecting 
 
54 Kaufmann (1998) p. 530. 
55 Of this opinion are Fauver (1998) p. 667 and Julian-Arnold (1993) p. 367. 
56 Julian-Arnold (1993) p. 365. 
57 Guibault (2002) p.25. 
58 Ricketson (1999) p. 15. 
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societies may be unreasonably denied access to material that might be used for public 
broadcasting. 59
 
It is perceived that these regimes were included to secure the interests of particular 
industries rather than those of authors or society as a whole. Guibault asserts that this 
fact may explain why such licenses have hardly been implemented.60 Davies, however, 
alleges that these regimes embrace a public interest in preventing monopolies.61  
 
The only CLs that might be provided under Berne based on a clear public interest 
objective are the ones set forth in the Appendix of the Convention.   
 
Developing countries may avail themselves of two types of CL. The first is a CL regime 
that allows a potential license to obtain a license for translation, when the purpose of 
such translation is teaching, scholarship or research. The second concerns the right to 
reproduction for use of works connected with systematic instructional activities. Both 
include also the right of publication.  
 
The structure of the provisions is extremely complicated due to the multiple conditions 
that must be satisfied by a potential licensee in order to obtain the license. Roughly, 
some of the hurdles are: 
 
a. CLs may only be available after a period of 3 years following the publication of 
a work. 
b.  After the three years have elapsed, the right owner enjoys a period of grace of 6 
months starting after a citizen of a developing country has requested the CL. 
During such period the owner may avoid the CL by publishing the translation. 
c. At any moment after the CL has been granted, the license may be terminated if 
the copyright owner exercises the right of translation and offers the publication 
for sale at a reasonable price.  
 
 
59 Ricketson (1999) p. 17. 
60 Guibault (2002) p. 25. 
61 Davies (2002) p. 10-021. 
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These systems were aimed to promote developing countries’ access to knowledge and 
education. It has been noted, however, that their complex provisions make them still 
favourable to developed countries.62 Indeed, such conditions may render the cost of 
exercising a compulsory license so high that its application is economically 
unfeasible.63 A recent survey evidences the failure of the provisions: only two out of 11 
developing countries have tried to incorporate this benefit.64
 TRIPS 
 
There is no specific reference to the term “compulsory licenses” in the TRIPS 
agreement. However, literature in the field considers Article 31 as the main provision 
concerning CLs in TRIPS.65 It is important to mention that this article deals specifically 
with patents.  
 
Article 31 includes emergency and extreme urgency, anticompetitive practices, public 
non-commercial use (governmental use) and dependent patents, as grounds for 
providing CLS.  
 
Concerning the structure, it is observed that the potential licensee would have to satisfy 
as well a number of conditions before they are granted. Countries shall draft their 
legislation bearing in mind no less than 10 conditions. Among them, we can mention:  
 
a. The proposed user shall make efforts to obtain the authorization on reasonable 
commercial terms over a reasonable period of time;   
b. The scope and duration of the license should be limited to the purpose for which 
it was granted; the license most be terminated when the circumstances that led to 
its grant cease to exist;  
c. The licensor shall be entitled to adequate remuneration;  
 
 
62 Ricketson (1999) p. 16. 
63 Okediji (2005) p. 164. 
64 Consumers International (2006) p.10.  
65 Article 31 is titled: “On use without the authorization of the right holder”. 
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2.2.2. CLs as an antitrust remedy.  
 
CLs have appeared both in Europe and the U.S. in cases involving an unjustified refusal 
to supply. Doctrines have been developed attempting to explain when an IP owner may 
be forced to “supply” IP protected goods through the granting of a license.  
 
In general, doctrines have developed to solve two kinds of conflicts:  
 
a. Misuse of IP. A misuse conflict may arise when IP rights are used contrary to 
the objectives that afford IP protection. The misuse doctrine has developed 
mainly in the U.S. case-law concerning patents. U.S. statutory law and courts 
have expressly rejected that a mere refusal to license may trigger antitrust 
liability if the IP right has not been misused.66 Misuse has been found only in 
three cases: tying of products, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office and 
“sham” litigation.67 However, the misuse doctrine was not followed apparently 
for the first time in Kodak.68 Interestingly for the purpose of our study, in this 
case the Court, after assessing the behavior of the patentee on the whole 
concluded that the IP right was (mis)used as part of a leverage strategy.  
 
b. Abuse of Dominant position. The assumption is that IP dominant firms may 
extend the protection of IP beyond its purpose, such as to expand or extend 
monopoly power. It is debated if the mere exclusive right may grant the IP 
owner a market dominant position and if network effects need to be considered. 
In Chapter three, I discuss in detail how the EC has granted CLs in refusal to 
deal cases, under the essential facilities doctrine.  
 
In general, it is observed that both in Europe and in the U.S., an antitrust violation for 
refusal to license IP is exceptional. For Fox, it is clear that the two dominant 
                                                 
66 See Xerox (refusal by Xerox to grant a license to use its patents was upheld due to the fact that Xerox 
did not misuse its IP rights).  
67 For a complete description of the cases and a full explanation of the development of the doctrine, see 
Taladay (2002).  
68 See Kodak in which the Ninth Circuit of Appeals, do not seek for one of the three objective criteria of 
misuse.  On the other hand, the court looked at the subjective intent of the company and its employees in 
implementing the refusal to supply  and found that the protection of IP was not in fact a motivating factor 
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jurisdictions in the world are reluctant to push back the boundaries of IP by application 
of antitrust.69 Kodak and the cases reviewed in Chapter three may indicate that courts 
have supported the remedy when leverage practices are obvious after an overall review 
of the specific circumstances of the cases.   
 
While the theoretical grounds for applying CLs are subject to considerable criticism (on 
similar allegations than those referred for patents), it is important to highlight that 
practical problems may arise. Competition law authorities may not have the necessary 
experience for drafting or assessing the final license. Shall the license grant only use of 
the IP good or shall it include know how? Is the judiciary or the competition authority 
capable of overseeing the fulfillment of the license?70 How shall a reasonable 
compensation be figured out?71  
 
 
 
but rather was being used as a pretextual justification for excluding competitors. See Taladay (2002) p. 
446.  
69 Fox (2005) p. 759. 
70 Areeda (1989) p. 853 asserts: “No Court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot […] adequately and 
reasonably supervise”. 
71 Leveque (2005) p. 21 observes: “From an economic perspective, the [European] Commission’s 
requirement is puzzling. Economists are familiar with optimal prices, not reasonable prices.  
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3 Compulsory Licenses for copyright: The European Experience 
 
3.1 Intellectual property and Competition rules in the Treaty of Rome 
 
The Treaty of Rome was designed to ensure the free circulation of goods, capital, 
people and services within the common market now being forged and administered by 
the European Union. Conflicts between IP and competition rules may arise from a 
complex set of rules in the Treaty. In principle, Articles 295 and 30 entitle Member 
States to define the rights and boundaries of property rights, including IP rights. 
Notwithstanding, restrictions to free movement of goods placed by the Member States 
with regard to property (such as copyright exclusivity) may not constitute means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.72 
The problem that arises immediately from this conundrum of rights and exceptions 
consists in defining when are IP rights’ exclusive protection a disguise for free 
movement of commercial goods. The ECJ found a way out by considering that the 
reconciliation had to be achieved in such way as to protect the legitimate exercise of IP 
rights and to preclude any improper exercise of them.73 Fox observes that while Articles 
295 and 30 might seem to point towards the primacy of IP over competition, such is not 
the case due to the fact that freedom from undistorted competition, provided in Articles 
81 and 82, is a Treaty right of almost constitutional dimension.74
 
The CLs that are examined in this chapter were issued in order to bring to an end 
infringement of Article 82 (b) of the EC Treaty. The relevant parts of this provision 
read: 
 
Article 82: Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
 
72 Treaty of Rome, Article 30. 
73 See Magill Judgment, par. 51. 
74 Fox (2005) p. 762. 
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the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such 
abuse may, in particular, consist in:  
(a)…  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers  
(c)…  
(d)…  
 
It is observed that nothing in the text of the Article makes any reference to CLs. The 
power of the European Commission to apply such a remedy derives directly from its 
statutory powers as endorsed by the interpretation of the ECJ. At the outset, it has to be 
mentioned that the Commission may not order a duty to license unless there is at least 
prima facie evidence that the right owner has abused its dominant position. 
 
A possible abuse is assessed through a two-phase process. Put briefly, in a first stage, 
the Commission performs an analysis of dominance, which includes:  
 
 a) Defining the relevant product/market: Definition takes into account the nature 
 of the product; the existence of substitute products, both from a competitors and 
 consumers’ perspective; the geographical market, among other factors;  
 
 b) Evaluation of the market power of an undertaking in the relevant market. 
 Such a test takes into account, inter alia, the market share of the undertaking, and 
 the level of dependency of other players with regard to the dominant firm.  
 
Once dominance has been found, the Commission assesses if the undertaking has 
abused such dominance. Article 82 in sections a) through d) only provides a non-
exhaustive list of types of abusive conduct. The EC and the Court have taken the task of 
identifying other types of abuse in particular circumstances. 
 
Volvo75 was the first case in which the ECJ faced a request for CL of IP rights. Veng 
was importing into the UK, and marketing, body panels the design of which was owned 
by Volvo, without Volvo’s authority. Volvo claimed infringement of its exclusive rights 
                                                 
75 See Volvo (Table of Cases).  
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to import and market the panels and Veng defended the case on the basis that Article 82 
required Volvo to supply the panels or license Veng the authority to produce them. The 
ECJ ruled that Volvo was under no obligation to license because such obligation, even 
against a reasonable royalty, would deprive Volvo of the very subject-matter of their 
exclusive right. However, the ECJ indicated that IP rights may be subject to compulsory 
licensing (even though this was not the case) if the proprietor was found to be in a 
dominant position, and if the exercise of the right revealed an “abusive conduct”.76
 
Since Volvo, it has become clear that whether an obligation to license IP rights or not 
would depend on the circumstances. Two months after the ruling of the ECJ in Volvo, 
the EC proved that such circumstances could be found in real life and, for the first time, 
ordered a compulsory license as a remedy in the case of Magill.77
 
The obligation under Article 82 to license has therefore been interpreted not as a general 
obligation to license applicable to any firm, but as a specific obligation on dominant 
firms to deal with any potential customers in specific circumstances.78 In my opinion, 
the obligation to license the reproduction and use of copyright information only has 
arisen where such information was considered to be essential for third parties to 
compete, either in the same market in which the copyright holder operated, or in a 
related market.  
 
Consequently, the question is: When is copyrighted information deemed to be essential 
to compete? The presentation of the three cases in this chapter will try to offer the 
reader the reasoning followed by the EC and the ECJ to conclude that the license of 
certain copyright-protected information is essential for restoring competition. Since 
commentators concur that such reasoning is based on the essential facilities doctrine, it 
is imperative to refer briefly in this section to the development of that doctrine.79  
 
 
76 Volvo, par. 9.  
77 See Magill Decision (Table of Cases). 
78 See Anderman (2006) p. 282 who suggests that the premise is: A firm or a group of firms that hold a 
dominant position have a special responsibility to act in a manner that does not harm competitors and, 
ultimately, consumers. 
79 Neither the ECJ nor the CFI have ever explicitly referred in their case law to the essential facilities 
doctrine. See IMS Health Decision p. 64. 
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3.1.1. The Essential Facilities doctrine.  
 
An essential facilities doctrine has been developed both in the U.S and in the EU albeit 
with certain differences.80 The basic premise, in Europe, is that where access to a 
facility is essential in order for a person to operate in a certain market, the owner of the 
facility may, in certain circumstances, be obligated to grant access to the person.81  
 
One commentator82 locates the origin of the doctrine in Community Law in the 
Commercial Solvents case.83 Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC) refused to keep 
on selling to one of its clients, Intituto Chemioterapico Italiano (ICI), raw material used 
in the production of a material called ethambutol. While assessing the dominance of 
CSC, the ECJ found that the company had a dominant position because there was no 
other material that can easily substitute such raw material in the market. The Court 
dismissed allegations about the existence of possible alternative processes for the 
creation of such raw material since such processes were still not conducted at an 
industrial level. The Court found that CSC had decided to stop supplying ICI the raw 
material – even though ICI was its customer – because CSC was starting to produce 
ethambutol itself. Because the refusal to supply was aimed to take out ICI from the 
supply chain, the conduct was considered as an abuse of dominant position.84 The facts 
of this case are relevant to our study, because both the EC and the ECJ have relied on 
the metaphor of “raw material” to consider that certain information might be 
indispensable material for developing other informational products.  
 
Later, in Bronner85, the ECJ clarified some aspects on the application of the doctrine. In 
that case, the Court established that an undertaking controlling a facility shall be 
obligated to grant access to competitors:   
 
 
80 Unlike in Europe, in the U.S. (where such doctrine originated) the doctrine requires the existence of 
two markets. Taladay (2002) p. 449-450 includes this definition of the U.S. doctrine: “The essential 
facilities doctrine is a specific type of refusal to deal characterized by a monopolists’ control of an 
essential facility, or bottleneck, that can extend monopoly power from one stage of production to another 
or from one market to another.”   
81 Fine (2002) p. 457. 
82 Id., p. 460. 
83 See Commercial Solvents (See Table of Cases).  
84 Id., par. 25. 
85 See Bronner (See Table of Cases). 
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a. If the refusal of access to the facility is likely to eliminate all competition in 
the relevant market; 
b. If such refusal is not capable of being objectively justified; and 
c. If the facility itself is indispensable to carrying on business, inasmuch as 
there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for that facility. 
 
In Bronner, the alleged essential facility was a system for house-to-house distribution of 
newspaper created by Mediaprint, the major newspaper publishing. Bronner, a small 
competitor, claimed that without access to such facility it would be unable to compete. 
After analyzing the system, the Court found that Mediaprint’s home delivery system 
was not an “essential facility” because it was not impossible or even unreasonably 
difficult for any other publisher to establish alone, or with others publishers, such a 
system.86 In our cases, the Court relied on Bronner when assessing if certain 
information was unreasonably difficult for competitors to substitute in order to compete.  
3.1.2. Power of the EC to grant CLs. 
 
The Commissions’ powers to issue compulsory licenses are grounded in the EEC 
Council Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty. Article 3(1) states:  
 
Where the Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative, finds that there 
is infringement of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty87, it may by decision 
require the undertakings or associations concerned to bring such infringement to an 
end (emphasis added). 
 
As can be observed, nothing in that provision article clearly allows the EC to order a 
CL. Such power derives from the interpretation of the ECJ in Commercial Solvents, 
which was further confirmed in Magill.  
 
In Commercial Solvents, it was disputed that such provision enabled the EC to require 
an undertaking to order specific supplies of raw material.88 Furthermore, the applicants 
 
86 Fine (2002) p. 460. 
87 Now Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  
88 Comercial Solvents. par. 43. 
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alleged that the amounts to be supplied ordered by the EC were disproportionate.89 
However, the ECJ endorsed the Commissions’ actions observing that a power “to bring 
an infringement to an end” may include an order to do certain acts. Likewise, the ECJ 
rejected the argument that the EC had exceeded its discretionary powers by ordering 
certain amount of material to be supplied. The Court found that the EC acted according 
to the proportionality principle by fixing the quantities to be supplied on the basis of the 
quantities previously supplied by one company to the other in their previous client-
customer relationship.90  
 
Later, in Magill, one of the claimants alleged that the EC could not actively require a 
party to grant a license. However, the CFI sanctioned the EC powers by stating that the 
EC was entitled under Article 3, in order to ensure that its decision was effective, to 
require the copyright holders to provide the copyrighted information to the potential 
licenses. The ECJ upheld the decision of the CFI: the imposition of an obligation to 
license the right of publication subject to certain conditions, including payment of 
royalties, was the only way of bringing the infringement to an end.91 Likewise the ECJ 
endorsed the CFI finding that the principle of proportionality had not been violated. The 
remedy was adequate to bring the infringement to an end.92
 
Once that we have reviewed the basic regulatory, administrative and judicial framework 
of CLs in the Community Law, we discuss in the next sections when copyright 
information has been deemed to be essential to compete.  
 
3.2 Compulsory License in Magill  
3.2.1. Summary of case 
 
Magill represents the first case in which a refusal to license a copyright has been held to 
be an abuse.93 In 1985, the EC was called upon to review the behaviour of three 
 
89 Id., p. 44. 
90 Id., p. 46. 
91 Magill judgment, p. 91. 
92 Id., par. 94-95. 
93 Forrester (1998) p. 35. 
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broadcasters whose radio and television (TV) programmes were broadcasted in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland. Such broadcasters were Independent Television (ITV), Radio 
Telefis Eireann (RTE) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (the 
“Broadcasters”).  
 
Before 1985, the Broadcasters used to publish their own weekly programme details in 
their own magazines. Since no comprehensive weekly TV guide existed in the market 
of such countries at that time, a viewer wanting to know what was going to be shown in 
the forthcoming week was forced to make a combined purchase of the three different 
magazines. On June 1986, a firm incorporated in Dublin named Magill TV Guide LTD 
(Magill TV) started publishing a weekly magazine containing such forthcoming 
programmes. Therefore, Magill TV’s magazine competed directly against the channel-
specific weekly TV guides sold by the Broadcasters. But, only two months later, Magill 
TV was prevented by UK Courts from conducting its business. The BBC and RTE 
obtained injunctions in national legal proceedings, relying on their copyright with 
regard to the TV programme listings. Magill complained to the EC on the basis that 
RTE, ITP and the BBC were abusing their dominant position by refusing to license their 
reproduction right to third parties and were in breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. 
The EC issued the Magill Decision in which it found breach of Article 82 and ordered a 
compulsory license. The CFI confirmed the EC Decision on appeal. Finally, and nearly 
6 years after the EC Magill Decision, in 1995, the ECJ resolved the case by basically 
upholding the CFI judgment.  
 
3.2.2. The EC Decision 
 
In the Magill Decision,94 the EC found that there was a breach of Article 82 and ordered 
a CL in the following terms:  
 
ITP, BBC and RTE shall bring the infringements [...] to and end forthwith by 
supplying each other and third parties on request and on a non-discriminatory basis 
with their individual advance weekly programme listings and by permitting 
reproduction of those listings by such parties. […] If they choose to supply and permit 
 
94 See Magill Decision (Table of Cases). 
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reproduction of the listings by means of licenses any royalties requested by ITP, BBC 
and RTE should be reasonable. […] The parties are therefore required within two 
months from the date of notification of this Decision to submit proposal for approval 
by the Commission of the terms upon which they consider third parties should be 
permitted to publish the advanced weekly programme listings which are the subject of 
this Decision95
 
With regard to the license terms, it is important to note the following:  
 
a. The license was narrow. It only included the right to reproduction for 
publication and encompassed only the basic information needed by Magill TV: 
the title of each programme to be broadcast, the channel and the date and time of 
the transmission. Other information usually licensed by the broadcasters to third 
parties (i.e., to newspaper companies) such as summaries and additional factual 
information were expressly excluded by the EC in its Decision.96 
b.  The Broadcasters were forced not only to license their rights to Magill TV, but 
to any other third party, on request and in a non-discriminatory basis. The EC 
explained in its Decision that an order to cross-supply the listings among the 
three Broadcasters would discriminate against third parties in the situation of 
Magill TV in a manner not compatible with Article 82.97  
c. The Broadcasters were entitled to include further terms in the license, 
particularly, terms considered necessary to ensure comprehensive high-quality 
coverage for all the programs.   
d. While apparently the parties were allowed to negotiate directly the terms and 
conditions of the license (including the royalties as far as they were reasonable), 
the EC reserved for itself the right to approve the final draft.  
 
3.2.3. Grounds: Information as necessary raw material 
 
 
95 Id., Art. 2.  
96 Id., Art 2. For product definition, see par. 7.  
97 Id., par. 27. 
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The EC, in general, did not question the validity of the copyright. It rather searched for 
anti-competitive behaviour. It asserted that not the copyright but the policies and 
practices of the Broadcasters, were the ones constituting infringements of Article 82 (b).  
 
The first hurdle for the EC was to prove that copyright owners were subject to 
competition law. It argued that they were, since the Broadcasters were receiving 
revenues both from direct sales of their magazines and from sale of advertising space.98 
When such argument was contested by the Broadcasters, the ECJ dismissed the 
contention and observed that it was a mistake to presuppose that the exercise of 
copyright may not be subject to competition law. 99
 
 A. Dominance in the relevant market 
 
The EC then assessed the dominance of the Broadcasters with regard to the advance TV 
listings market. When defining the market, the EC analyzed if it was possible both for 
competitors and consumers to substitute the weekly listings. The EC found that for any 
third party willing to publish a comprehensive publication, the listings constituted the 
essential raw materials. This was mainly because an attempt to publish a 
comprehensive publication without the three sets of listings was economically unviable; 
likewise, consumers did not have any substitute for weekly TV listings; the only other 
substitute was the daily listings that newspapers published under the Broadcasters 
licenses; however,  that was held to be a different product and therefore, a different 
market.100  The CFI and later the ECJ uphold the EC finding, observing that the 
Broadcasters were, by force of circumstances the only sources of the basic information 
on programme scheduling which was the indispensable raw material for compiling a 
weekly television guide.101
 
When assessing dominance, the EC found that only the Broadcasters were entitled to 
make last-minute changes to the broadcasting schedule.  Consequently, third parties’ 
dependency in this case was driven by the impossibility of creating reliable substitutes, 
 
98 Id., par. 19. 
99 Magill Judgment, p. 48. 
100 Magill Decision, par. 20 and 21. 
101 Magill Judgment, par. 53. 
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a characteristic of dominant position.102 Later, the CFI and the ECJ upheld this finding 
observing that since the Broadcasters were the unique source of such information, they 
constituted a de facto monopoly. By force of circumstance, the appellants were in a 
position to prevent effective competition in the market.103
 
 B. Abuse of Dominant Position.  
 
Once the Broadcasters were held to have dominance, the EC assessed if their conducts 
constituted an abuse of their dominant position. The EC highlighted a variety of 
corporate practices which ultimate goal was the prevention of competition. From the 
arguments proposed by the EC, the ECJ found the existence of an abuse, upon the 
evidence of the following “exceptional circumstances”:  
 
a. The Broadcasters relied on national copyright provisions in order to prevent 
the appearance of a new product.104 Injunctions obtained by Broadcasters 
under copyright procedures were found to make competition impossible 
without a license. The refusal to supply was hindering competition and was 
prejudicial to consumers, because it was impeding the emergence of a new 
product (Magill TV Magazine) which enjoyed considerable demand, albeit in 
a brief period.  
b. There was no justification for such refusal to license.105 
c. By refusing to license, the Broadcasters reserved to themselves the market of 
weekly television guides by excluding all competition in that market since 
they denied access to the basic information which was the raw material 
indispensable for the compilation of such a guide.  
 
3.3 Compulsory License in IMS Health 
3.3.1. Summary of the case.  
 
 
102 Id., par. 22. 
103 Id., par. 47. 
104 Id., par. 54.  
105 Id., par. 55. 
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The IMS case was brought to the ECJ after a complex factual procedural history which 
involved two different proceedings: first, an intellectual property case heard by the 
courts of Germany, and, secondly, a competition action before the EU Courts.  
 
In brief, IMS Health (“IMS”) was a company that collected data of pharmaceutical sales 
from drugstores and then elaborated and provided sales reports for pharmaceutical 
firms. Those reports were elaborated under a specific format named the “1860 brick 
structure” (the “1860 structure”), a database developed by IMS, after several years of 
working closely together with the pharmaceutical industry. By dividing Germany into 
1860 geographical areas, according to the same number of postcodes, the structure 
allowed IMS to elaborate useful reports for pharmaceutical firms.  
 
In February 1999, an ex-director of IMS created a rival firm named PII, which entered 
into the market with a brick structure of 2201 segments. The product was rejected by 
the industry because it was impossible to aggregate such information into the 1860 
structure. PII launched then a second product with 3000 bricks, fully compatible with 
the 1860 Structure and was a market beauty. However, IMS obtained injunctions in 
copyright proceedings thus preventing PII to use either the 1860 Structure or any 
derivate structure.106 After such judgment, two competitors of IMS, NDC (a global 
competitor of IMS, which had acquired PII) and AzyX, tried to obtain a license from 
IMS.  After IMS’s refusal to license, both firms filed before the EC alleging that such 
refusal was an abuse of dominant position under Article 82. The EC ordered a CL as an 
interim measure,107 but later this order was overruled by the CFI, considering that such 
relief shall not be applied while there was pending CFI analysis on the merits. By the 
same days, the Court that was reviewing the copyright issues requested the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling. The ECJ ruling not only confirmed Magill but also broadened the 
“exceptional circumstances” that may reveal an abuse of dominant position.  
 
 
106 A Frankfurt Court judgment of 28 December 2000 granted an injunction preventing the selling of data 
in both the 2847 and 1860 segments and any other number of segments so far as it constitutes a derivative 
from the 1860 brick structure.  
107 Community law establishes that the Commission may grant protective interim measures when it  
considers that, in a case, there is a risk of serious and irreparable harm and intolerable damage to the 
public interest. In such cases, it suffices for the EC to find a prima facie infringement. 
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3.3.2. The EC Decision 
 
On 3 July 2001, the EC issued a Decision imposing upon IMS, as an interim measure, a 
duty to license its copyright. 108 This CL differs in some aspects from the one granted in 
Magill, almost 15 years before. Article 1 of the Decision states:   
 
IMS  Health  (IMS)  is  hereby  required  to  grant  a  license  without  delay to  all  
undertakings currently present on the market for German regional sales data 
services, on request and on a non-discriminatory basis, for the use of 1860 brick 
structure, in order to permit the use of and sales by such undertakings of regional 
sales data formatted according to this structure. (Emphasis added)  
 
Unlike the Broadcasters in Magill, IMS was forced to license to specific competitors. 
The EC shift may be explained by considering that the competitors did not seek from 
the EC a final decision but only immediate relief through interim measures. Another 
difference is that Article 2 of the Decision introduces a price-setting mechanism.109 
While the parties are entitled to negotiate the royalties, such faculties are lost if no 
agreement is reached within two weeks after the request has been made. Then, royalties 
shall be determined by independent experts chosen by the parties. If such procedure 
does not suffice, the EC intervenes by appointing experts. Ultimately, the EC is entitled 
to approve such royalties.  
 
Article 2 of the Decision does not clarify if the EC powers for approving the royalties 
extend also to other terms of the license. Apparently, the EC did not strive to narrow the 
scope of the license in order for the remedy to be proportionate. The EC alleged that the 
information to be disclosed was only information that was already in the public domain 
and not secret information.110 The real issue was that only reports processed through the 
1860 structure were useful for the industry and therefore the use of the 1860 structure or 
compatible structures was essential for competitors to compete in the market. 
 
 
108 See IMS Health Decision (See Table of Cases). 
109 IMS Health Decision Art. 2.  
110 Id., par. 199.  
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It is also notable that the Decision includes a coercion element: Failure of IMS to 
license within the timeframe provided by Article 2 triggered a penalty, which was 
supposed to be charged on a daily basis until the obligation was fulfilled.111
 
3.3.3. Grounds: Copyrighted database as a de facto industry standard 
 
The high market share that IMS had in the German market, being such country, the 
largest market for sales o data services in Europe was enough evidence of dominance. 
Relying again in Bronner, the EC assessed whether the 1860 Structure or any 
compatible structure was indispensable to compete on the relevant market defined (the 
market was that of regional sales of data services). In order to find out such 
indispensability the EC examined if it was possible to create a substitute that 
pharmaceutical companies would be willing to buy. For such purpose, the EC requested 
and received information from 85 industry players.112  
 
The EC found that even though the use of the 1860 Structure was not required by law, 
such structure had become a de facto industry standard.113 Most companies – the EC 
quoted statements of many pharmaceutical firms – were reluctant to switch to a 
different format due to the major internal cost to be incurred in the process.114 Refusal 
to switch was absolutely understandable. IMS had developed the 1860 Structure by 
working together with the industry (in a Working Group)115 over years and as a result, 
IMS and the industry developed systems that were compatible to analyze the data.116 
The EC found that by doing so, the pharmaceutical companies became voluntary locked 
into this standard. Switching away, so as to buy sales data formatted in a non-
compatible structure, whilst  theoretically possible, would be an unviable economic 
proposition.117 In the opinion of the Commission, there had arisen a de facto standard:  
 
111 Id., Art. 3.  
112 Id., par. 27. 
113 Id., par. 89. 
114 Id., par. 89.  
115 Some pharmaceutical firms were apparently surprised that IMS was claiming copyright in the database 
since – they alleged – the structure was developed by several industry firms. See Id., Par. 80-84. 
116 I.e. Compare the sales of company products with the sales of a competitor in a specific block (a 
“block” is a postal code territory); measure sale representative performance or compare old sales data 
with new for the same territories.  
117 Id., par. 92 and following.  
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In part because of [investment in Working Group cooperation] the 1860-brick 
structure  appears  to  be  the  optimum  to  be  achieved  and  to  correspond exactly  
to  the  requirements  of  the  pharmaceutical  companies.  This in part explains their 
dependence, built up over a long period, on this structure, the extremely high 
disincentives they have to switch to a new one, and so the impossibility for a 
regional sales data service formatted in another structure to be able to compete.118
 
The ECJ confirmed these findings and upheld the new element for assessing the 
indispensability of the facility: the degree of participation by users in the development 
of that structure shall be taken into account, particularly in terms of cost, on the part of 
potential users in switching to a different structure.119  
 
Likewise, the EC found that there was no likelihood of competitors creating an 
alternative structure. According to Bronner, the EC needed to find technical, legal or 
economic obstacles that make impossible or unreasonably difficult, the creation of a 
similar facility to compete. The EC found that such obstacles were in place in this case. 
From a technical perspective, even though it was possible to create and use other 
structures based on diverse criteria, only reports based on post codes would be useful 
for the industry.120 From a legal perspective, the Frankfurt Court injunction prevented 
any potential competitor to produce “derivates” from the 1860 structure without a 
license. However it had failed to clarify what a derivative work was. The EC evidenced 
that IMS had exploited such uncertainty by warning pharmaceutical companies about 
not dealing with its competitors in order to avoid copyright infringements.121 In any 
case, the mere threat to be suited after investing in developing a new structure was 
found to be sufficient legal constraint.  
 
 
 
118 Id., par. 83. 
119 IMS Health Judgment, p. 30 (See Table of Cases). 
120An alternative database using as main criteria drugstores names may cause computers not to recognize 
misspelled names; likewise, an alternative based on drugstores addresses would have to be manually 
imputed in case of a changes of domicile. See IMS Health Decision, p. 131. 
121 Id., p. 143, 144.  
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Finally the EC found that the refusal to license was unjustified under community law.122   
 
3.4 Compulsory License in Microsoft123 
3.4.1. Facts of the case  
Sun Microsystems, a competitor of Microsoft in the market of workgroup servers, 
complained in 1998 before the EC alleging that: (i) Microsoft had a monopoly in the 
Windows 2000 Operating System (Windows OS) and Microsoft’s Windows 2000 
Office Suite (Windows Office) and that it was using such dominance in order to 
leverage its monopoly in the Microsoft’s workgroup server OS (Windows Server OS) 
within the workgroup server OS market. Sun alleged that such leveraging strategy 
consisted in Microsoft’s refusal to supply adequate information about the interface 
codes that would enable Sun servers to interoperate efficiently with Microsoft-
integrated packages of the referred Window products, all of them dominant products in 
the market. Such refusal, thus limited the possibilities of Sun to offer workgroup servers 
that may interact with customers who used Microsoft products but were willing to be 
served by non-Microsoft servers.  
 
After 6 years of research, the EC issued a Decision finding that Microsoft held near a 
monopoly in the referred Windows OS and that its refusal to supply information that 
may ensure the interoperability of such system with non-Microsoft servers constituted 
an abuse of such dominant position. The Decision is under current review by the CFI.  
 
3.4.2. The EC Decision 
 
In its Decision, the Commission ordered Microsoft to disclose complete and accurate 
specifications for the protocols used by Windows work group servers. It is important to 
stress that the license was narrowly construed: It do not compel Microsoft to disclose its 
 
122 Id., p. 169. It is important to mention that the Frankfurt Court found that the refusal to license by IMS 
was justified because the firm did not possess a clear title on the 1860 structure and could not grant a 
license without its possible co-authors. See Gitter (2002) p. 160-161. 
123 See Microsoft Decision (See Table of Cases). 
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source code, but only the protocols:124 the mere interface specifications that are 
necessary to achieve interoperability.  
 
The EC, mindful that such protocols have evolved – and would continue to develop – 
over time, locking in customers through network effects, stressed that the obligation 
encompassed not only the current protocols (for Windows 2000) but all past products 
for which Microsoft still supports online self-help support,125 and future products.126 
The order to supply encompassed also an order to authorize the implementation of such 
specifications in work group server operating system products. The license was limited 
to reproduce the protocols and use them to write their own specification interfaces. 127
 
Even though the Commission allowed Microsoft to mould the terms of the licenses, it 
stressed that such terms must not be unreasonable with respect to the access and use 
ordered.128 With regard to future products, the EC included terms that might be difficult 
to monitor in the future: protocols concerning future products shall be granted in a 
“timely manner” and the policies for qualifying to license shall be “stable” in order to 
protect competitors’ investment when developing new products.129
 
With regard to the royalties, the EC did not specify any price-setting mechanism. 
Microsoft was free to fix the compensation for a period no longer than 120 days, such 
compensation being subject to approval from the EC. While the “reasonability” 
requirement was maintained, the Microsoft license included a new element: price l 
should not reflect a strategic value. Even though there existed similarities with 
Commercial Solvents, the EC was unable to fix a royalty fee here since before refusing 
to deal, Microsoft used to disclose such information to Sun free of royalty.  
 
3.4.3. Grounds: The protocols as an essential facility 
 
 
124 Id., par. 999. A protocol is treated in the Decision as information that provides an interaction between 
instances of the Windows client PC operating system and the Windows work group server OS. 
125 Id., par. 1001. 
126 Id., par. 1002. 
127 Id., par. 1003. 
128 Id., par. 1005. 
129 Id., par. 1007. 
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Bearing in mind that the reader may have at least a general idea of the economic power 
of Microsoft in the software industry, I will not stop here to describe the reasoning 
followed by the EC in order to define the relevant market and assess the firm’s market 
power.  
 
What is important to understand is why the protocols were found to be an essential 
facility. The main task of the EC here was to undertake a complex, technical and 
lengthy analysis of the information to which access was denied. The goal of such 
examination was to determine which precise information was essential for Sun and 
other players to compete in the market. The EC evaluated the arguments of Sun, 
Microsoft and other industry members and found that work group servers needed a 
“core” of information to interoperate with other PCs and other servers. Such technical 
specifications were necessary to compete because the protocols were needed for 
developing compatible products. Interestingly, the EC, on its reasoning, considered that 
the refusal of Microsoft to supply some other information requested by Sun was out of 
the scope of the evaluation and therefore of the final Decision.130  
 
After determining which information was essential, the EC then attempted to evidence 
that Microsoft’s refusal to supply reflected a leveraging conduct which ultimately aimed 
to foreclose the market.  
 
It is remarkable that even though the EC tried to follow the Magill/IMS test, it did not 
focus on finding a limited number of “exceptional circumstances” that may indicate that 
the refusal to supply was an abuse of dominant position. Conversely, it followed its 
tendency to expand this test to include new circumstances. Furthermore, the EC did not 
hesitate to state that the Decision was based on the “entirety of the circumstances” as 
they are discovered “in the whole comprehensive investigation”.131 In my opinion, the 
EC could be seen as sending a message to the Courts: the exceptional circumstances test 
developed in Magill/IMS, which states that only in a narrow set of circumstances may a 
refusal to supply be considered as abusive, might be too narrow.  
 
 
130 Id., par. 566. 
131 Id., par. 555.  
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While assessing if there were exceptional circumstances to assert abuse, two factors 
appeared to be decisive: The Sun Solaris workgroup OS which would be unable to 
operate smoothly without the protocols, was not only not a clone product of the similar 
product of Microsoft but was also not a new product under the meaning of the 
“exceptional circumstances” test. Conversely, such servers preceded those of 
Microsoft’s in the market and had a considerable demand. Under these facts, the EC 
considered that the refusal to supply was actually harming an innovative competitor.132 
Sun did not need the protocols to be a “follower” that may compete with Microsoft 
product. Sun needed access to continue with its innovating process with regard to a 
product which had an enormous demand in the market.  
 
The second factor would have sufficed by itself to indicate the illegality of Microsoft 
behaviour. The EC found that Microsoft had followed over the years, as a business 
strategy, an “open system” policy where interface protocols were given free of royalty. 
Due to the consolidation of Microsoft products and network effects, Microsoft’s refusal 
to keep on supplying this information might discourage consumers from choosing non-
Microsoft servers.133 Therefore, Microsoft strategy was to leverage its power in the 
workgroup server OS market, into the server market. This conduct, as we saw in 
Commercial Solvents, sufficed to conclude that the refusal to deal was in breach of 
Article 82.  
 
A commentator observes two important new features in the Microsoft case. First, the 
introduction of a new exceptional circumstance: A copyright holder may be found to be 
reducing the incentives to innovate of a competitive firm. Apparently, the EC is 
proposing that if an input is indispensable and that the refusal to supply eliminates 
competition and reduces incentives to innovate in the industry and there is no 
justification for such conduct, then an abuse would be evidenced. The CFI and the SCJ 
would have now the difficult task of evaluating if the “exceptional circumstances” test 
would continue to expand to new circumstances. The second element is that the 
Decision suggests that network effects need to be considered as factors that might 
produce monopolistic outcomes in the information industries.134  
 
132 Anderman (2006) p. 230. 
133 Id., par. 706. 
134 See, in general, Lévêque (2005). 
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3.5 Evaluation  
 
The cases studied provide evidence that the EU experience demonstrates: (i) that 
copyright is not, and shall not be, isolated from competition rules; and (ii) that 
compulsory licenses might be a proper and versatile tool to stand as a proportional 
remedy in competition-copyright conflicts. The EU experience, however, has not been 
free of criticism.  
 
It has been argued, for example, that the distinction between the existence and the 
exercise of copyright is artificial. The ECJ invented it to justify its competence in IP-
related cases;135 and that even in those cases the essence of copyright substance has 
been narrowly conceived by the courts, the result being that competition outweighs the 
interest in protecting IP.136
 
The fact that the ECJ has developed a variation of the U.S. essential facilities doctrine 
has been highly criticized. The U.S. doctrine establishes a per se rule that under a 
certain narrow and cumulative set of circumstances, the refusal to license may be 
disapproved without any further justification.137 The trend started by the EC and upheld 
by the ECJ to include new circumstances in light of the peculiarities of the cases 
reviewed, make it difficult to establish general conclusions.138 The reliance on the 
particular facts of each case has made the application of the doctrine extremely 
complicated.139
 
Additionally, Ullrich considers that equating information to raw material is a simplistic 
analogy and claims that information hardly lends itself to an objective test of 
 
135 In an early stage, it was argued that the Court had not competition to review IP cases since Article 222 
of the Treaty of Rome provides that questions of property had to be dealt with under national law. See 
Groves and Martino (1993); the need to examine the “essential function” of copyright and its “specific 
subject matter” were invented by the ECJ to justify its encroachments upon national trademark and 
patents laws in order to pursue market integration. See Forrester (1998) 35-10. 
136 Fox (2005) p.762. 
137 Rahnasto (2003) p.144. For clarification on the term per se rule see Section 2.1.2 above.  
138 Forrester (1998) p. 35-10 notes that most scholars considered that if the EC would have been unable to 
act in Magill, it would have never been able to intervene in an IP-competition conflict. The author asks if 
the “exceptional circumstances test” shall be renamed as the “odd exceptional circumstances” test. 
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substitutability.140 It is alleged also that the participation of customers in the creation of 
IP, which is today a commonplace, has been overestimated when assessing if protected 
work is essential.141 Moreover, CLs with regard to such goods confer access to 
information and create potential problems of co-ownership.142 This means depriving the 
owner of the substance of its exclusive right143 therefore removing a policy tool which 
encourages innovation and the production of IP.144
 
A further deviation from U.S. theory is that, in the U.S., the essential facilities doctrine 
may only apply where there are two clear separate markets and a firm uses its rights in 
one market to leverage its power – harming competition – in a second market. The 
Commission, based on ECJ case law, has blurred such a distinction allowing CLs in 
benefit of undertakings competing against the right owner in the same market.145  
 
Even though the IMS Health Judgement clarifies the “new product” requirement, 
sending a powerful message that new products were required and that no clones of 
protected works would satisfy the test,146 some authors consider that such interpretation 
is not straightforward and may cause an avalanche of litigation by non-innovative, 
would-be free-riders. 
 
In addition, before the Microsoft Decision, scholars observed that trivial copyrights, 
such as those at stake in Magill and IMS, would hardly gain copyright protection under 
traditional copyright regimes.147 However, others assert that relevant industries in which 
IP serves to create standards (like information technology industries) where customers’ 
ability to switch from one system to another is difficult, shall be worried by the EC case 
law, due to the fact that the duty to license is broadening.148
 
 
139 Rahnasto (2005) p. 144. 
140 Ullrich (2001) p. 387. 
141 Gitter (2002). 
142 Ullrich (2001) p. 397. 
143 Rahnasto (2003) p 145. 
144 Gitter (2002) p. 184. 
145 Narciso and Torremans (2005) p. 153. 
146 Anderman (2006) p.230. 
147  Forrester (1998) p. 35-10 with regard to Magill; with regard to IMS, see Fine (2002).  
148 Gitter (2002) p. 154. 
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Finally, it has been said that the Court has contributed to creating unpredictability as the 
emphasis has shifted from competition-specific analysis to the issue of fairness between 
the parties.149 The Court has relied more on equity than in developing precise tools for a 
competition-specific analysis of information access.150 Not the EC but the Courts have 
betrayed classic competition law principles, which goal is to protect competition rather 
than competitors.151  
 
In my opinion, all these criticisms evidence how Community law is still struggling in 
balancing the interest of copyright owners and competition law beneficiaries. By 
striving to anchor in previous case law related to physical facilities, the theory has 
evolved with considerable irregularities. It is clear that cases which had called upon 
some sort of fairness criteria rather than a purely economic approach, along with the 
peculiarities of Community Law, have contributed to such complex development.   
 
For developing countries or countries with less experience in the application of 
competition tools, both the review of the doctrine and the criticisms offer useful 
information that may serve for Competition authorities, judges and policymakers. 
Furthermore, such countries might have the opportunity to develop the doctrine 
specifically for informational goods without having to deal with a baggage of history. 
Some of the lessons that I consider important to recoup from the European experience 
are the following:  
 
a. Copyright holders shall not be isolated from competition rules.  
b. There might be at least two behaviours that may be considered abuse: (i) the 
refusal to sell/provide essential information to a dependant innovative enterprise 
in order to eliminate that company as a competitor; and (ii) the exercise of 
copyright to prevent the emergency of new products for which there is consumer 
demand. 
c. Case-law evidence that only copyright holders with market power need to worry 
about facing this additional obligation to license.  
 
149 Ullrich (2001) p. 397. 
150  Id., p. 398. 
151 Narciso and Torremans (2005). 
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d. Access to certain protected informational goods may be necessary to compete, 
particularly when databases or software products reach a category of de facto 
industry standards. 
e. CL may prevent leveraging practices (using one market to increase power in a 
second market) and also practices that attempt market foreclosure (there is no 
need for two markets).152 
f. CLs shall be drafted narrowly to include only the information that is necessary 
to restore competition. Such proper definition is key for the remedy to be 
considered proportional.  
g. CLs are used exceptionally.153 Companies that invest in technology shall not be 
worried of facing an avalanche of requests for licenses since that has not 
happened in Europe.  
h. Even if unusual, its use should be exemplary. Copyright-holders in dominant 
positions would need to consider seriously request for licenses.  
i. Competition authorities shall allow the licensor to draft the license. Such 
licenses are easier to enforce and monitor than those designed by authorities.  
j. Competition authorities shall be entitled to undertake long-term research. The 
evaluation of the whole circumstances is essential in order to use the tool only in 
special cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 Fine (2002) p. 459. 
153 Id. The author observes that following the Magill Decision, many commentators predicted an 
avalanche of litigation brought by free riders and that such scaremongering has proved unfounded; 
likewise, the EC has stated that it would use such a powerful weapon carefully. See Forrester (1998) p. 
35-14. 
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4 Can Mexico benefit from the European experience?  
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses how Mexico may avail itself of the legal and doctrinal 
developments examined in Chapter 3. Such analysis should begin with an overview of 
the Mexican IP and competition law frameworks. However, since this work is addressed 
mainly to Mexican judges and policymakers, it is assumed that such framework is 
known already. Consequently I will focus mostly on the provisions that may serve as a 
basis for the discussion.  
 
Mexico lies within the tradition of civil law countries. Commercial matters are governed 
by statutory law enacted by the Federal Congress. Our discussion will be based on three 
statutory laws enacted by such Legislature: The Industrial Property Law of 1991 (IPL) 
which governs patents; the Federal Law of Authors Right of 1996 (FLAR), which 
governs copyright and neighbouring rights; and the Federal Law of Economic 
Competence of 1992 (FLEC), which deals with monopolies and anticompetitive 
behaviours.154  
 
Such instruments were enacted almost simultaneously as part of the Mexican 
negotiation strategy to execute the NAFTA regional trade agreement with Canada and 
the U.S.155 The goal of the new laws was to create a friendly environment for foreign 
investment, since the U.S. had heavily criticized the prior protectionist framework.156 
As a consequence, one of the main goals of the new laws was to limit greatly the 
 
154 See Table of Legal Instruments.  
155 NAFTA Chapter XVII (Articles 1701 through Article 1721 and four annexes) dealing with IP entered 
in force in Mexico in December 1992.  
156 Mexican laws on IP and foreign investment were considered by the U.S. as restrictive on the import of 
foreign technology, and the prospect of being part of NAFTA forced Mexican policymakers to draft more 
foreign investment friendly policies. See Vaca (1994) p. 183. 
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conditions where Mexican government may avail for CLs, particularly in the field of 
patents.157
 
4.2 Penetration of Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Law 
 
In line with the Berne, TRIPS and WCT agreements, FLAR assimilates software 
products to literary works and protects with exclusivity rights such works and original 
databases. Non-original databases receive a sui generis protection. While FLAR 
includes a number of limitations concerning the exercise of copyrights, CLs may only 
be granted for the publication or translation of some artistic works.  
 
Chapter I of Title 6 is named: “With regard to copyright limitations due to Public 
Utility.” However, Article 147, reproduced below, stands alone in that chapter.  
 
The publication or translation of literary or artistic works necessary for the 
advancement of national science, culture and education shall be considered of 
public utility. When it is not possible to obtain the consent of the holder of the 
corresponding patrimonial rights, the Federal Executive branch, through the 
Department of Public Education, ex officio or as requested, may authorize the 
aforementioned publication or translation against the payment of a compensatory 
remuneration. The preceding shall be without prejudice to international treaties 
on copyrights and related rights signed and approved by Mexico. (Emphasis 
added). 
The title of the chapter suggests that CLs provided there may serve the broad concept of 
public utility.158 However, in my view, the wording of the provision seemingly allows 
only for a more restricted interpretation. Similarly to the CLs contained in the Berne 
Appendix, the only rights that the license may encompass are the publication and the 
translation rights and apparently, only if the right holder cannot be located. In addition, 
CLs may only be granted if the work belongs to the scientific, culture and educational 
 
157 Id. Consequently, under current IPL, CLs might be issued to prevent the existence of non working 
patents (See IPL Art. 74-74); also on grounds of governmental non-commercial use, in cases of 
emergency or national security (See IPL Art. 77). There is no evidence that any of those CLs have ever 
been issued.  
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fields. Apparently, a public interest in promoting access to copyright works for 
economic or technological development is not likely to qualify clearly on any of those 
categories; likewise, arguably copyright works that have been subject to license in 
Europe would qualify for a license under this provision.  
4.3 Designing a Compulsory Licenses regime within the Copyright law system   
 
This section explores the possibilities of designing in Mexico a regime of compulsory 
licenses as an internal limitation within copyright law. An attempt to sketch a specific 
proposal for legal reform, including the substantive and procedural conditions that such 
regime may comprise, is outside the scope of this thesis. For our discussion, it suffices 
to assume that a CL regime might be fashioned to remedy cases where an authority 
finds (cumulatively):  
 
(i) copyright abuse; and  
(ii) where such abuse has been aimed at, or has had as effect, the obstruction of 
access to certain copyrighted products; and 
(iii) where such access is desirable on grounds of public utility, such as  
socio-economic or technological development. 
 
It is submitted that such reform might move forward along two possibilities. A first 
option would be to draft a detailed provision within Chapter I of Title 6 of the FLAR 
describing a hypothesis built under the referred conduct. A second alternative would be 
to amend Article 147 to clarify that “public utility” may encompass access to 
information that may promote the goal referred in number (iii) above.  
 
In any case, the Federal Congress shall avoid drafting a legal reform that may be found 
to contravene international treaties.159 Mexico is party to the Berne Convention, TRIPS, 
WCT and NAFTA agreements. Since TRIPS incorporates automatically all the 
 
158 Labariega, (2002), when analyzing the constitutional framework for copyright law in Mexico, 
considers this kind of compulsory license as an example that authors’ rights, as any other property, may 
be limited on grounds of public utility 
159 The SCJN has ruled that international treaties executed by Mexico which do not contravene the 
Mexican Constitution have Constitutional level and therefore may preempt Statutory Federal law. 
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“exceptions and limitations” admitted under Berne160, and considering that NAFTA’s 
relevant chapter may be considered a “specific arrangement” within the meaning of 
Article 20 of the Berne Convention,161 TRIPS might be the relevant starting point for 
assessing any legal text which attempts to include a new limitation to copyright.  
 
4.3.1. Exploring TRIPS possibilities 
 
There are few doubts that TRIPS entitles Member states to create regimes of CLs. 
Article 8.2 provides the following as one of the TRIPS principles:  
 
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by 
right holders or to resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology. (Emphasis added). 
 
Certainly, the drafters of TRIPS were concerned about IP owners’ “abuse” of rights. 
Furthermore, according to TRIPS literature, it is indisputable that CLs may qualify as 
“measures”. However, how may Member States understand abuse and how may a CL 
regime qualify as “consistent” with the treaty objectives and “appropriate” to prevent 
such abuse?  
 
Literature is divided between a strict interpretation of the principle and a broad one. 
Further complicating the interpretation is the fact that the TRIPS limitations were 
drafted having in mind patents and licensing (transfer) of technology, but not 
trademarks or copyright.162 Therefore, only until very recently have scholars focused on 
how CLs might be drafted by Member States in copyright legislation. Our question, 
however, has not been explored, but barely posed by leading scholars in the field. For 
instance, Ullrich observes:  
 
 
Moreover, international treaties in Mexico are self-executing see Amparo en Revisión 1475/98 Sindicato 
Nacional de Controladores de Tránsito Aéreo. 11 de mayo de 1999. LXXVII/1999. 
160 Ricketson (1999) p. 15. 
161 Rangel (1998) p. 30-3. 
162 Ullrich (2005) p. 738. 
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“One question for example is what the TRIPS agreement might say about the use of 
certain intellectual property as an “essential facility” or as “raw material” or 
interface for access to various peripheral and after-markets.163  
 
Proponents of a rigorous interpretation consider that TRIPS provides examples in the 
field of patents and (licenses for) transfer of technology concerning how CLs most be 
drafted. It suffices to observe how Article 31 subjects the issuance of CLs to a number 
of conditions, thus sending a message that the drafters considered its provision as a last 
(and, perhaps, little desired) remedy. National laws that do not set forth similar 
conditions would be inconsistent with the Agreement by evaporating TRIPS 
concessions to right holders.164 Similarly inconsistent would be the provision of CLs, 
when grounded in general broad terms such as “public interest” and even with regard to 
anti-competitive behaviours if not justified by objective criteria (i.e., a CL provided on a 
judicial rationale closer to “fairness” rather than “market efficiency”.165 In any case, and 
particularly for copyright works, consistency shall be measured as well against TRIPS 
Article 13, which not only incorporates the famous “Three Step Test” set forth in the 
Berne Convention Article 9(2) but also extends it to all possible uses of protected 
works.166 Considering all these limitations, it is observed that competition laws’ limits 
on patents may be more likely to survive a challenge than similar limits on 
copyrights.167
 
The TRIPS negotiation history may support such a view. TRIPS was designed to create 
IP standards, not competition rules. All rules concerning anticompetitive behaviour 
were included after strong pressure from developing countries. In such a context, one 
commentator observes that the “consistency” requirement was included to address a 
general concern of industrial countries that developing countries may rely too much on 
competition law with a view to limiting TRIPS concessions.168 Article 8.2 shall 
therefore not be considered as an invitation to developing countries to counterbalance 
increase of IP protection by offering grounds for proactive license and technology 
 
163 Ullrich (2005) p. 729. 
164 UNCTAD (2005) p. 551. 
165 UNCTAD (2005) p. 554. 
166 TRIPS Article 13: “limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights may only be established by Member 
States in certain special cases; (ii) which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work; (iii) and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the right holder.” 
167 Ghosh (2005) p. 808. 
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transfer strategies, but rather as cautious form of containment of any (developing 
country) national regime of limitations.169  
 
Some other commentators promote a broad interpretation. To them, the “consistency” 
requirement shall not be measured against how limitations were drafted for patents; it 
shall be measured against the objectives of the Treaty, and the principle included in 
article 8.1., which entitles Member States to adopt measures “to protect public health 
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance of 
(Members States’) socio-economic and technological development”.170 Yusuf observes 
that a broad interpretation of “public interest” may offer member states a considerable 
degree of flexibility on the basis of each country’s particular socio-economic and 
technological development considerations.171
 
The fact that there is no explanation of what constitutes an “abuse” is found here to be 
an area of opportunity, conceding states broad authority to define what may constitute 
an abuse. There are no TRIPS restrictions that such a term may encompass unilateral or 
bilateral conduct as far as IP rights are found to be exercised contrary to the basis and or 
objectives of national particular IP protection tradition.172 Dysfunctional use or misuse 
of copyright may exist with substantial market power, relative market power or not 
market power at all.173 From such a perspective, the grounds provided by TRIPS (i.e. 
Article 31) are by no means the only ones. Public interest may encompass other 
interests too.174 May a refusal to supply access to copyright-protected information be 
considered as blocking a public interest of socio-economic or cultural development? 
The answer is not straightforward. However, Watal, when analyzing examples in 
comparative law, observes that some countries apply compulsory licenses on basis of 
broad public interest formulations and quotes as an example the German law, where 
CLs might be issued “whenever they are indispensable”.175  
 
 
168 UNCTAD (2005) p. 551. 
169 Ullrich (2005) Art. 739. 
170 TRIPS. Art. 8.1.  
171 Yusuf, (2001) p. 14. 
172 UNCTAD (2005) p 547; see also Ullrich (2005) p. 731. 
173 Ullrich (2005) p. 733. 
174 Watal (2001) p. 321. 
175 Id. p. 322. 
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Authors of such viewpoints argue that the history of the provision may as well support 
such a broad interpretation. It is observed that U.S. negotiators were willing to include a 
non-exhaustive list of “abusive” conducts mirroring the U.S. misuse doctrine. The fact 
that such a list was not accepted at the end implies that broad discretion was given to the 
states to define abuse and possible limitations.176
 
4.3.2. Exploring NAFTA possibilities 
In any case, after building a (successful) regime under TRIPS, the creature would need 
to survive as well a NAFTA test. Even though NAFTA provisions were almost literally 
copied from the TRIPS Agreement,177 the slight differences suffice to consider NAFTA 
as a TRIPS-plus regional agreement.178 Article 1705(6), for example, provides that:  
 
No party may grant translation and reproduction licenses permitted under the 
Appendix to the Berne Convention where legitimate needs in the Parties territory for 
copies or translation the works could be met by the right holder’s voluntary actions 
but for the obstacles created by the parties’ measures. 
 
Since I am not offering here a specific proposal of reform, I will not undertake here a 
discussion aimed to prove if a particular text may contravene expressly or implicitly 
NAFTA provisions. It suffices here to point out that such review might represent 
another hurdle for legislators.  
 
Furthermore, it is clear that including an express provision of “compulsory license” (as 
is usual in copyright instruments) may create tensions with NAFTA partners and 
jeopardize foreign investment.179 Recently, Mexico has been heavily criticized by the 
U.S. due to an alleged lack of enforcement of copyright law and is actually struggling to 
reduce piracy rates and counterfeiting in order to attract NAFTA partners’ 
investment.180 Consequently, the inclusion of an express measure aimed to allow legal 
 
176 Id., p.319. Reference is made to Correa and Gervais, among other authors supporting such view.  
177 This is the opinion of one of the leading Mexican practitioners in the field: see Rangel (1998) p. 30-2. 
178 Endeshaw (2006) p. 376. 
179 Vaca notes that the very notion of a CL may seem unsettling to U.S. practitioners and businesses. See 
Vaca (1994) p. 183. 
180 See IPPA (2006). Mexico has recently returned to the U.S. Special 301 Watch List. The U.S. 
government places on this list jurisdictions which, from the U.S. point of view, do not provide adequate 
IP protection. 
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access to copyrighted works might be evaluated as an unfortunate and even unfriendly 
policy.  
 
4.4 Possibilities of compulsory licences under the current Mexican Competition Law 
framework 
 
The goal of this chapter is to examine specifically whether Mexican current competition 
law framework would provide ground for issuing CLs in cases similar to the ones 
examined in Europe and under analogous economic reasoning. The question might be: 
Is the Federal Competition Commission (hereinafter “CFC”) entitled to issue CLs as a 
remedy if it faces enough evidence that a copyright holder in a dominant position has 
abused their copyright by refusing to license, prejudicing competitors and consumers? 
This study indicates that such an answer will only be solved on the merits of a particular 
case. Consequently, this chapter rather focuses on assessing the structural possibilities: 
Would the CFC be ready to provide such license (lawfully)? 
 
Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution prohibits monopolies, monopolistic practices 
and practices interfering against commerce, within the boundaries that such activities 
may have in statutory law. Such boundaries are set forth in the FLEC.181 Its 
enforcement is entrusted to a branch of the executive federal government – the CFC.  
 
4.4.1. Traditional isolation of copyright from competition rules.  
 
A first significant hurdle will be the traditional perceived isolation that copyright 
holders have enjoyed from competition rules; such separation originates in Article 28 of 
the Constitution and has been supported by statutory law and legal doctrine. Article 28 
states:  
 
All temporal production privileges granted to authors and artists with respect to their 
creation shall not be considered monopolies. The same privilege shall be granted to 
 
181 During the course of writing this thesis, on 28 June 2006, the FLEC underwent substantial 
amendments which are crucial for this study. The current analysis is based on the amended text. 
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the inventors or improvers of inventions who are using their creations in an 
exclusive way.  
 
Such provision was copied textually into Article 5 of the FLEC and remained untouched 
until the very recent reform to the FLEC (the “Reform”).182 Conveniently for the 
purposes of this work, the Reform apparently has provided ground for believing that 
such isolation might be coming to an end. The new text of Article 5, in fine 
incorporates, together with the paragraph quoted above, a new paragraph which 
clarifies, at least, that FLEC is applicable to authors:  
 
The economic agents in the above mentioned paragraph shall be subject to the 
application of this Law with regard to those acts which are not expressly 
encompassed within the protection provided in article 28 of the Constitution.  
 
Even though this clearly suggests a shifting from the traditional isolation of IP rights 
from competition rules, the extent of such a move is not clear. Moreover, the new 
paragraph is somewhat confusing given that the Constitution does not expressly refer to 
any specific “acts”, but merely refers to “privileges”. Mexican legal doctrine has 
traditionally linked such an old-fashioned term with the package of economic benefits 
derived from copyright exclusivity.183 Consequently, it is difficult to read which acts 
derived from copyright exercise are not encompassed in the term and, therefore, subject 
to the review of competition laws.  
The “Exposition of Motives”184 does not explain the rationale of the amendment. Yet, at 
least, it casts light on the aim pursued by the Federal Congress. Article 14 of the 
Exposition explains that the FLEC was designed in order to be applied to all economic 
agents and that it is important to remark that authors, artists, inventors and improvers 
 
182 Decree that amends the FLEC (published D.O.F 06.28.2006.).  
183 See Lavariega (2002) p. 50. 
184 The “Exposition of Motives” is a statement akin to an Explanatory Memorandum which is drafted 
together with any new law or legal reform and aimed at elucidating the intention of the legislature. Such a 
document is crucial for the judiciary when trying to interpret the goal that the legislator pursued with any 
new provisions.    
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are subject to the law with regard to acts attributed to them that harm the competition 
process.185  
To summarize, while it is clear that that the legislature attempted to clarify that authors 
shall be treated as economic agents, it largely left to the judiciary the difficult task of 
identifying which acts are covered by the Constitutional protection and therefore not 
subject to competition.  
4.4.2. Exploring the possible ground for the provision 
 
While Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome clearly refers to an “Abuse of Dominant 
Position”, FLEC does not embrace a provision dealing specifically with such conduct. 
However, an OECD report notes that single-firm practices that may be defined as abuse 
of dominant position or monopolization in other countries are treated as relative 
monopolistic practices under FLEC.186 Accordingly, it is worth exploring similarities 
with the European developments in the context of Article 10(v) of the FLEC, a 
provision that specifically deals with refusal to supply:  
 
Subject to verification of [substantial market power in a relevant market] relative 
monopolistic practices are deemed to be those acts, contracts, agreements, 
procedures or combinations, which aim or effect is to improperly displace other 
agents from the market, substantially hinder their access thereto, or to establish 
exclusive advantages in favor of one or several entities or individuals, in the 
following cases:  
I … 
V.. The unilateral action based on refusing to sell, commercialize or provide to 
specific individuals, goods or services available and normally offered to third 
parties; (emphasis added) 
 
 
185 Id., Article 14.  
186 OECD (1998) p. 10. Relative monopolistic practices or “vertical” practices are those whose objective 
or effect is to improperly displace other agents from the market, substantially limit access, or establish 
exclusive advantages in favour of certain persons. Practices such as tying sales, exclusive dealing or 
refusal to deal are encompassed in the list of behaviors prohibited by Article 10. These practices are 
prohibited per se only if the undertaking is found to have substantial market power in a relevant market.  
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In order to apply such an Article, the CFC follows a similar procedure to the European 
Commission:187 (i) defining the relevant product market, through a relevant market test 
analysis; (ii) assessing if the undertaking has substantial market power; (iii) locating a 
refusal to deal practice; and (iv) evaluating if the refusal  is justified. Only unjustified 
refusals create competition liability.  
 
4.4.3. Relevant market and substantial market power test 
 
My conclusion that the analysis carried out by the CFC is similar to the one carried out 
by the EC is far from tenuous. The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) has 
expressly relied on such similarity. In Warner Lambert,188 the SCJN was called upon to 
clarify such concepts in a merger case, where the CFC issued a decision to nullify a 
merger.   
 
Warner Lambert alleged that the FLEC violated its constitutional rights because: (i) 
FLEC failed to define the concepts of “relevant market” and “substantial market 
power”, among others; and (ii) CFC violated the “Division of powers” principle189 by 
defining such terms in its Decision, a “legislative” power that may only be exercised by 
the Federal Congress. The SCJN, while conceding that indeed the FLEC failed to 
provide definitions, dismissed the Warner Lambert argument. The Court resolved that 
legislators are called upon to formulate general, abstract and impersonal rules and that it 
is the administrative authority which shall give more precise meaning to such terms 
when applying them in a particular case. In such exercise, the administrative body may 
only be prevented from performing an arbitrary interpretation. The Court found that that 
was not the case, since CFC had interpreted the concepts within the meaning of 
competition law discipline. Such interpretation was – according to the SCJN – the 
intention of the legislator when incorporating purely economic concepts in the law 
 
187 See FLEC Articles 11 – 13. The procedures for assessing market power in a relevant market are 
similar to the ones used in the U.S. and the recent “modern” approach that is being developed in Europe. 
See OECD (1998) p. 11. Anderman (2006) p. 136 and Ullrich (2005) p. 750 have noted the recent 
influence of U.S. “efficiency” criteria in EU organs, which used to conduct such analysis with less 
analytical rigor. (Cf. the use of “fairness” criteria in, e.g., Magill). 
 
188 See. Warner Lambert  p. 290 and followings.(See. Table of Cases) 
189 This is, the “check and balances” principle. 
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without providing them with a specific meaning. It is important for this study to note 
that the Court considered that there was substantial international experience in defining 
such terms and expressly quoted Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and a doctrinal 
review of the reasoning of the ECJ in the Hugin case as examples of how such concepts 
have been interpreted within the discipline.190 In line with such experience, the SCJN 
observed that it was within the powers of the CFC to construe such definitions basing its 
reasoning on the specific facts of every single case reviewed.  
 
I therefore consider that CFC has been empowered by the Highest Court in Mexico to 
carry out an analysis of market power that might consider interpretations of the EC and 
ECJ.  
 
4.4.4 Refusal to deal as an abuse of an undertaking with substantial market power 
 
In my opinion, Art. 10(v) gives sufficient ground to the CFC to assess a refusal to 
license by copyright holders bearing substantial market power. Copyrights are goods 
available and normally offered to third parties pursuant to Art. 10(v). The question then 
would be to find out if such undertaking might be forced to license if the refusal to deal 
is found to be unjustified. Article 10 provides in its preamble three criteria for assessing 
such justification.  
 
Two of these criteria appear to be important for our study: Is such refusal to deal 
intended to, or does it have the effect of, (i) improperly displacing other agents from the 
market; or (ii) substantially hinders other economic agents access to such market? I 
have not found any CFC Decisions or Court precedents which deal directly with how 
these questions are to answered. However, some rulings may provide more indirect 
guidance. These rulings are considered briefly in the following. 
 
 
190 Id., p. 296-298. 
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The CFC Decision in Federal Commission of Electricity 191  
The Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE) is the state-owned electricity company. It 
owns the electrical infrastructure of the country (transmission line towers and 
distribution line posts) and is obligated by statutory law to lease such infrastructure to 
telecommunications carriers as long as the safety and operative conditions make such 
lease possible. For telecom carriers, such agreements are the only possibility for 
operating, since it would be legally impossible and economically unreasonable to 
develop own infrastructure to lay down their cables. 
 
WLC was a telecom carrier which started negotiations with CFE. Although WLC was 
in compliance with all requirements, CFE was apparently delaying the execution of the 
leasing contracts, alleging that the general conditions for executing the contract had not 
been defined yet. The CFC started an investigation of a relative monopolistic practice 
on grounds of unjustified denial of treatment.  
 
During the investigation, the CFC found that:  
 
1. CFE was an agent with substantial power in the relevant market, since 
CFE was the proprietor of almost all the electrical infrastructure 
available for leasing to telecommunications licensees; 
2. CFE did have the capacity to restrict supply since it determined the 
necessary technical safety and operation conditions to provide the 
relevant service; 
3. However, CFE had failed to sign lease agreements with 3 other carriers 
because it was undertaking an internal revision of participation schemes 
in the telecom industry. Therefore, the failure to close the contracts was 
not a denial of treatment but a suspension of the formalities, which 
would be resumed when the CFE governing body approved new schemes 
that would allow qualified applicants access to the infrastructure on non-
discriminatory bases.  
 
 
191 See CFE. Investigation Ex-Officio CFC.File: IO-01-2001. (Date of Resolution April 3, 2002). 
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The CFC ruled that the alleged refusal to deal was not unjustified since there was not 
evidence that such refusal was aimed to deny WLC access to the market or to 
discriminate against it with respect to other companies.  
The CFC Decision in Aeromexico.192
In another Decision, the CFC followed a similar reasoning yet found a refusal to deal as 
unjustified. In this case, Aeromexico, a major Mexican airline, refused to receive travel 
agency services from entities that sold Aeromexico’s competitors airline tickets. In such 
a case, the CFC found:  
1. That Aeromexico enjoyed substantial market power in the market of tickets for 
air travel services in the City of Chihuahua, since Aeromexico controlled most 
of the flights to and from the City.  
2. That the refusal to deal caused at least one travel agency, Bault, to buy tickets 
allocated by Aeromexico to other travel agencies. Such restriction placed Bault 
at a disadvantage position with regard to other agencies.  
3. That Aeromexico’s refusal to deal with Bault was not justified, since Bault met 
the requirements established by the Airline for transactions of that kind and;  
4. That Aeromexico’s conduct was clearly aimed to prevent or discourage its 
current and potential clients from looking for alternative sources of supply.  
The Commission ruled that Aeromexico’s practice was causing the undue exclusion of 
several economic agents and substantially hindering their access to the market and 
ordered Aeromexico to suspend its unilateral action and provide Bault and any other 
agent who met the applicable requirements, with any tickets requested under the 
applicable policies.  
Following the reasoning of the CFC in these cases, it might not be unreasonable to 
assert that a justification of a refusal to deal case involving copyright would be assessed 
against the potential of such refusal to hinder third parties’ access to the market or 
improperly displacing them from it.  
 
192 See. Aeromexico. Complaint. File: DE-35-99 and DE-55-98. (Date of Resolution: August 3, 2000)  
  57 
                                                
Moreover, the SCJN in Warner Lambert interpreted CFC powers as broad for 
conducting such assessment:  
“… The solution of a concrete case depends upon the appreciation of the 
authority of the particular circumstances in such case. It do not follows that the 
authority is free to dictate –even arbitrarily – the correspondent resolution 
because in all cases the exercise of its powers would be subject to the 
principles of fundamentacion193 and motivacion194 … The application of broad 
legal concepts [on cases like Warner Lambert] allows to recognize two  
valuable [legal] principles: First, the need that it shall be the authority entitled 
to apply the law the one that shall evaluate the particular circumstances of the 
case, in order to reach the most fair decision (emphasis added); on the other 
hand, the need that [the judiciary] exercise afterwards a control over the 
authority in order to preserve [the constitutional rights] preventing the 
authority arbitrary actions.”195
Bearing in mind that the EC and the ECJ (and even the Court in Kodak in the U.S.)have 
relied not only on economic analysis, but also on some sort of subjective fairness 
arguments when ruling in specific cases after evaluating the circumstances of these 
cases as a whole, I consider that the CFC may attempt to grant CLs based on refusal to 
deal cases, if the particular facts of the case merit such a remedy. 
Moreover, it is submitted that the Mexican judiciary might evaluate “fairness” in the 
field not as purely “market efficiency” (even if that would be the probable reasoning of 
the CFC). I base this observation on a binding resolution issued by the SCJN in 
previous case law, where it dealt with the powers of the government to establish 
limitations to free participation in the market.196. In such precedent, the Court observed 
that Article 28 was introduced to protect the social interest, not individual merchants, 
and that the concept of “monopolistic practices” was introduced by the legislator in 
order to deter practices that may damage society, and to strength the position of medium 
and small size companies and consumers, which are the ultimate victims of such 
practices.197
 
193 In brief, it set forth that the administrative authority shall refer to the exact legal provision in which the 
resolution is based.  
194 In brief, it set forth that the administrative authority shall link the provision to the actual conduct.  
195  See Warner Lambert, supra note  
196 See “Comercio, Derecho del Estado para establecer limitaciones a la libre concurrencia” (Tomo XLV 
del citado Semanario, Quinta Epoca, pág. 1978). 
197 See Warner Lambert.  
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4.4.5 Powers of the CFC to grant CLs 
Article 35 sets forth the powers of the CFC to issue remedies and penalties.  
The former text of Article 35 granted broad powers to the CFC but narrowed the field of 
application only to concentration cases.198 The new provision allows the CFC to 
suspend or correct monopolist practices and not only concentrations. 
 
Article 35: The Commission may apply the following remedies:  
I. Order the suspension or correction of the monopolistic practice or 
concentration in question (emphasis added)  
 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that the ECJ interprets that the EC’s power to “bring an 
infringement to an end” encompasses the power to impose positive obligations; 
otherwise, EC action may not be “effective”. In the present context, while the terms 
“correct” and “suspend” may not be precise, it has already been pointed out that an 
“obligation to sell” was imposed over Aeromexico. The obligation to sell in that case 
was considered as a means of suspending the practice.  
 
The powers of the CFC to issue preliminary injunctions have been the main target of 
litigation in the last 10 years. In most cases, the SCJN has upheld CFC decisions issuing 
preliminary injunctions even if the legal ground of such injunctions was unclear.199 The 
SCJN has upheld such Decisions noting that the CFC has a Constitutional mandate to 
take decisive actions against monopolistic practices due to the pernicious effects that 
such practices bring to the society: Efficacy, security and swiftness shall be the 
characteristics of CFC procedures.200 In the light of such precedents, it is submitted that 
CLs might be justified as an effective remedy to suspend a refusal to license practice.   
 
 
198 The term “Concentrations” in Mexican law encompasses mergers and other kinds of structural 
combinations, such as share or asset acquisitions, joint ventures, cross-share-holdings and interlocking 
directorates.  
199 OECD (2004) p. 12. 
200 For a comprehensive study concerning the main Mexican Court resolutions in the field of competition 
in the first 10 years of the FLEC, see Moguel (2004). 
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4.4.6. TRIPS and NAFTA tests 
 
Would the effective provision of CLs be deemed as in line with TRIPS, NAFTA and 
Berne? It is important to remember that in Magill, the Broadcasters claimed that the EC 
was acting illegally by imposing a remedy which contravened Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention (the “Three Step Test”), The ECJ refused to undertake such analysis and 
found a way out by observing that the European Community was not part of the Berne 
Convention.201 Likewise, in IMS Health, it was alleged that the EC Decision may 
conflict with the European Community’s international obligations because it caused 
IMS an unreasonable prejudice to their legitimate interest under Berne and TRIPS.202 
The EC defended its Decision by offering arguments to surpass the Three Step Test; 
similarly, the EC considered that the CL was a consistent remedy under TRIPS Article 
8.203 However, such arguments have still not been reviewed or confirmed by the ECJ. 
The question remains hanging in the air.  
 
Again, CFC would also need to carefully assess whether the remedy is possible with 
respect to NAFTA provisions. Article 1505, for example, when defining “Monopoly”, 
expressly excludes from being considered monopolies those entities that enjoy an IP 
right, merely because of the enjoyment of such right.  
 
In this case, the CFC may find useful the existence/exercise dichotomy developed by 
the ECJ. Despite such distinction has received substantial academic criticism,204 it is 
apparently admitted in cases where the legal monopoly provided by the existence of the 
right has grown into a factual monopoly in the market. For Ullrich, this means that it is 
not the exclusive right or the operation of the intellectual property what is at stake, but 
the use that is made of it in the absence of competition.  Where a factual monopoly has 
aroused, antitrust rules shall apply to IP, because IP protection cannot longer meet its 
purpose nor operate as intended by the legislator.205  
 
 
201 Magill Judgment, par. 72-74. 
202 IMS Health Decision, par. 206. 
203 Id., par. 207-212.  
204 See  Note 135 
205 Ullrich (2001) p. 384.  
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The CFC apparently followed a similar reasoning when it resolved to authorize the 
merger of Glaxo Wellcome and Smithkline Beecham on the condition that both firms 
divest themselves of the patents rights of certain medicines.206 In such case, the CFC 
found that the patent term of protection placed a barrier that hindered the entry of other 
players in the market because it made impossible for new players to compete in the 
short term.  This however, did not apparently suffice for disapproving the merger. An 
additional and crucial finding was that with the merger, the referred firms would reach a 
joint market share that would be considerable higher than that of Novartis, their only 
competitor; therefore, the merger would provide the agents with the capacity to 
substantially restrict supply in the market of such product, since Novartis would not 
have sufficient capacity to counteract actually or potentially those firms power.  
 
It can be inferred from that Decision that it was not the existence of the patent right 
what created the monopoly effects; conversely, it was the fact that such right would 
provide the merging Firms with a factual monopoly in a market where no competition 
was possible. 
 
 
206 See Glaxo Wellcome PLC / Smithkline Beecham PLC. File: CNT-76-2000 (Resolution date: 
09.07.2000). 
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5 Conclusions 
 
The European Institutions have taken the lead in showing how CLs – as a remedy 
provided by competition law – can be used to prevent a copyright owner, holding a 
dominant position, from abusing its copyright, when such abuse has a potential to 
hinder competition in prejudice to competitors and consumers. Such development is 
remarkable, if considering that socio-economic and industrial developments are 
pointing out that copyright owners, particularly in the knowledge industries, are 
increasingly using copyright in order to control the behavior of competitors and secure 
undesirable monopolistic profits. The European experience reveals that copyright 
owners shall not be immune to competition surveillance and that competition law may 
counterbalance unwelcome effects of copyright exclusivity. It further serves as an 
example of how CLs may be used as versatile instruments which, if carefully tailored to 
correct specific behaviors, can stand as appropriate, exceptional and proportional 
remedies to contain the abuse of copyrights.  
 
It is observed that this European exercise is not free of substantial criticism. The 
doctrine that serves as platform for analyzing such cases has developed with 
inconsistencies due to the nature of Community law, the particularities of the cases that 
were resolved and the transplantation of such doctrine from physical goods to 
informational goods. Such irregularities have created a doctrine which is difficult to 
defend as a proper scientific method to evaluate similar cases. It does not provide 
rational or efficient outcomes on when protected information shall be subject to a duty 
to license. Consequently, it has the potential either to become only applicable in 
straightforward cases or to keep unfolding without rigor, and become a tailor-made 
remedy for each circumstance. If the first possibility happens, it might loose its leading 
light (up to now, it has been able to react to developments such as de facto industry 
standards and pernicious networks effects); if the second possibility occurs, it might 
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continue to create uncertainty within the business and academic community. Under 
these circumstances, in my view, the doctrine is not a product suitable for exportation.  
 
However, it is submitted that the European experience indicates that judges and 
policymakers in developing countries should re-think the relationship between 
copyright and competition law. Such reconsideration is urgent bearing in mind that the 
developments referred to in this thesis suggest that copyright overprotection or the 
abuse of copyright points toward a future where information, the key element for 
development, might become unlawfully appropriated. Under these circumstances, this 
thesis concludes that the European experience provides noteworthy elements that might 
be used by developing countries as building blocks for creating competitive-based IP 
systems. 
 
I have reviewed here two possibilities that Mexico may have for benefiting from such 
experience. With regard to the first path – a reform under TRIPS possibilities– I 
conclude that even though it is clear that a reform might be valid under TRIPS and 
probably under NAFTA, Mexican legislators may need to carefully review TRIPS and 
NAFTA interpretations on how to incorporate such a remedy without incurring 
international liability. It is submitted that a key for a successful reform would be to 
design a normative hypothesis sufficiently specific and that may not be considered as a 
pretext to undermine protection of IP rights. However, as this would necessarily imply 
the use of the (perhaps fearsome) term “compulsory license”, such a legal reform would 
face substantial political hurdles, mainly coming from the foreign (particularly U.S.) 
industries.  
 
The second path – issuing CLs based in the current regulatory framework – seems a 
more straightforward solution. It is submitted that CFC is provided with sufficient 
powers to act decisively in cases involving refusal to supply copyright works. Of course 
the path has a number of hurdles but such hurdles, particularly the political ones, cannot 
be compared with those on the first path. It is submitted that the structural provisions 
are in place; what is needed is legal experience that might serve to break the traditional 
paradigms. In my opinion, a CL which (i) is justified by sound research and solid 
economical analysis; (ii) succeeds in narrowing the field of the license only to 
information necessary to compete; and (iii) as a consequence can be defended as an 
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effective and proportionate remedy under the circumstances of the case, has substantial 
possibilities to succeed a SCJN review and even a TRIPS and NAFTA challenge.  
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